Erroneous Gaps in Honorable Sandra Townes Decision.

By 

(1) Judge Sandra Townes (Italics)  

(2) Sampson Iroabuchi Onwuka  (Pro se)

"ONWUKA v. TAXI LIMOUSINE COMMISSION No. 10-CV-5399 (SLT)(LB).

SAMPSON IROABUCHI ONWUKA, Plaintiff, v. TAXI LIMOUSINE COMMISSION, Defendant.

United States District Court, E.D. New York.

March 31, 2014.

Sampson Iroabuchi Onwuka, Plaintiff, Pro Se.

City of New York, Interested Party, represented by Steven Mark Silverberg, New York City Law Department.

Office of the Corporation Counsel of the City of New York, Interested Party, represented by Linda Margareta Mindrutiu, New York City Law Department."

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

SANDRA L. TOWNES, District Judge.

“For almost three years, this Court has been attempting, without success, to have the pro se plaintiff in this action submit a comprehensible complaint. In August 2012—shortly after plaintiff responded to a memorandum and order directing him to file a third amended complaint by essentially resubmitting the second amended complaint—Corporation Counsel requested, for the third time, that this action be dismissed pursuant to Rule 41(b). For the reasons set forth below, that motion is granted.”

BACKGROUND

“The Court has issued three prior memoranda and orders in this case. Although this Court assumes familiarity with those prior rulings, the Court will briefly summarize those rulings to demonstrate the extraordinary lengths to which the Court has gone in an effort to elucidate plaintiff's claims.”

“In late 2010, plaintiff filed a four-page form complaint, which attached a four-page, typrewritten narrative and several exhibits. Although that complaint named the "Taxi Limousine Commission"—presumably, the New York City Taxi and Limousine Commission ("TLC")—as the only defendant and failed to state a claim against the TLC, the facts alleged in that pleading suggested that plaintiff was attempting to state a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against TLC employees for police brutality and/or malicious prosecution. Accordingly, in a memorandum and order dated December 28, 2010 (the "First M&O"), this Court granted plaintiff leave to amend his complaint to, among other things, "name as defendants those individuals whom he alleges to have been personally involved in `police brutality' and/or `malicious prosecution.'" First M&O at 4. That memorandum expressly advised plaintiff that the TLC was not a suable entity and that he "should not name the TLC as a defendant" with respect to his claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C.”

                                                           Judge Lois Bloom

This is a direct appeal to the Court and to the Judge Lois Bloom and Honorable Judge Sandra Townes, seeking requisite and overdue actions for a number of itemized issues raised by the Plaintiff, Sampson Iroabuchi Onwuka in suit against the City of New York and State of New York which was dismissed on March 31st, 2014 for failure to respond to a motion by the Defense to dismiss. The Court need to re-instate the Case in the context of several thresholds; that the Plaintiff is determined to remind the Judge that inactivity of the Court fractured the suit, that the Plaintiff’s action followed the Order and Memorandum of the Court for a Third Amended Complaint. The Court was under no obligation in honoring any complain from a private or through the help of an attorney from the ‘Office of the Corporation Counsel of the City of New York, Interested Party, represented by Linda Margareta Mindrutiu, New York City Law Department’ whose defenses of the plaintiff couldn’t have happened since the woman in question was never solicited for by the Plaintiff or was any contact made between the Plaintiff and the attorney or any information whatsoever transferred between the Court and the Plaintiff either of the line, through the electronic means such as email or through any letter of the deputations, that the claims pampered in the judgment granted by Honorable represents any account of the correspondences between the Plaintiff and the Court or in between these varied agencies so described. This Linda is fatuous process of carefully revealing giraffe court procedure when has not to do with her for the law of it, that such actions gives us the impression the Plaintiff did not listen to the Court or there are question of technicality which he failed to address. The Judge should be reminded that the attorney who took the job had to exit the case largely for poor and lurid correspondences between the Plaintiff and the City and State of New York. With his exit came finality on the hearing at the State Court who decided the case without responses from the plaintiff.

Assuming the State and City of New York is under the illusion that lack of informed currier between the Plaintiff and the respondent was incident enough for dismissal, it needs to be added that in so far as dismissal is concerned, that the plaintiff had earlier petitioned with the help of Attorneys for Summary Judgment which they believe was overdue given the legality of the case and Federal civ. 55 (e) regarding primary execution of remedy when a case is not challenged in Court. These men and their assistance raised the privileged issue of duration of Court hearing and why in respect to Judge Sandra objections to Federal CIV 55 (e), that based on Rule 12 and lack of fast track rule, that the Court could not honor the motions to award the dispute. Rights of Dispute are a City (County), State, and Federally protected constitutionality, leaves the dividing party to applause on the merit of the case or award to be determined by a Jury. The Indubitable rights to Jury if requested by Plaintiff are inviolable unless there is special exemption.

1. This Request by the Plaintiff for 'Summary Judgment' via (C), Fed. Civ. 55 was rejected by Judge Sandra L. Towne, citing Rule 12, 1915 (e) (2) (B) (ii) and Fed. R. CIV, for P.41.

(1)    Lack of subject-matter jurisdiction; (2) lack of personal jurisdiction (3) improper venue (4) insufficient process (5) insufficient service of process (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; and lack of presentation of the allegation material.

The dismissal of the justly initiated procedure is impossible to describe except for named prima facie course which imperils the delivery rate of the injured party, that the Jury was invoked by the Plaintiff  exults the privileges of the Respondent – it could in essence go either way – that the case still be rejected by the people of the State but against the plethora of imminent facts which the prosperity of legit leaders of the law with Second Circuit certiorari has affirmed interest, that they will be more than happy to handle the case if there is anything hardly missing for prosecutors. It will be missed during the trial.  Mordantly speaking, it is impossible to deny that the Defendants have not measured the estimable outcomes of the lengthy Court process, to the degree that the levity of Supreme Court process and remedial applications or invocations thereof of the law towards redress and redemption will not fail to expose the whole show of dismemberment of the plaintiff who from the beginning has not been considered by the law even in the most lurid light possible.

This indicia of personal calculus is already priced into the process, that the damage of the process leading to this single benefit of the law had to obstructed that in so doing, the twin towers of 1983 and 1928 which the Judge petitions for would be consigned to the flames going by the assumptions in the piece.  The respondent are also aware that the power of attorney so purchased at this level is best probably an induction to process, whereas enough catchment of legal minutia between the Plaintiff and his advisors is more than meet the demands of the Court Yet the dismissal papers are not bullet proof,  it is not necessary that the plaintiff should defend himself or pursue legal recourse by himself, but this Court should worthy of what drove the machination of the Plaintiff that he hardly knew the left and right of the Court process and processes let along argue for the court from purely as third party litigant representing the first.  His emotional immunity is wrestling this form is not an abject conjecture, it is part of a process of determination of rights when and however necessary, when and whoever possible. 

But this cannot happen, going by the financial difficulties that the State of New York and the City of New York imposed directly and indirectly on the Plaintiff, this could not have happened.  The Plaintiff wants to point that silence and inactivity of the Court is injurious precedence to his course and has been, that pursuant Fletcher V, Peck – where Judicial inactivity of the supreme court gave material meaning to the presumption of aiding a binding member state of these United States, Chief Justice John Marshall dodged the taint of association over the corruptible contractual agreement as marginalized by a certain state called Georgia, inserting that “it would be indecent in the extreme” for the Supreme Court to “enter into an inquiry respecting the corruption of the Sovereign power of a state.” That that State of Georgia “…cannot be viewed as a single, unconnected, sovereign power, on whose legislature no other restrictions are imposed than may be found in its own constitution. She is part of a large empire; she is a member of the American Union.”

To dismiss a justly initiated law suit is not any incident to the Judge, it is part of the acceptance in the process of redemption that something was wrong with the process. It matters here that the State of New York is also aware of it the process, that the dismissal was based on presumed failure to sign a narrow piece of paper or larger volumes as they deems fit. It matters also that the City of New York is aware of it, that they like any institution can wrong any private and forget about it. But this is not the case.

“§ 1983. Id. at 5. That First M&O specifically directed that no summonses be issued. Id. at 7.”

Judge’s Account

“In early February 2011, plaintiff filed an unsigned, 10-page document entitled "Complaint Amendment," and the Clerk of Court erroneously issued plaintiff a summons. Although Corporation Counsel immediately notified this Court that the summons had been issued in error, see Letter to Hon. Lois Bloom from Asst. Corp. Counsel Bradford C. Patrick, dated Feb. 10, 2011, plaintiff subsequently served the summons and his "Complaint Amended" on the TLC. When the TLC failed to file an answer or move to dismiss plaintiff's pleading, plaintiff moved for a default judgment. The TLC not only opposed that request, but cross-moved to dismiss plaintiff's pleading either for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), or for failure to comply with the First M&O.”

“In Onwuka v. New York City Taxi Limousine Comm'n, No. 10-CV-5399 (SLT)(LB), 2012 WL 34090 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 6, 2012) (the "Second M&O"), this Court declined to enter a default or to dismiss plaintiff's case. In discussing the TLC's motion to dismiss, this Court noted that plaintiffs amended pleading failed to comply with the First M&O. Specifically, the complaint continued to name the TLC as the sole defendant, did not make clear whether plaintiff intended to sue any of the ten individuals named in the body of the complaint, and did not clearly state what each of those individuals did or failed to do. Aware that plaintiff was representing himself and unfamiliar with the pleading requirements, the Court provided plaintiff with guidance on how to prepare a second amended complaint and with the number of the Pro Se Office.”

Dismissal of a law suit can be based on a number of technicalities all of which converge entirely on the Court procedure and standard; that the Clerk, the Bench and above all the Judge are part of the dismal process that makes it possible for a redemption to take place. That the Case was dismissed in the poor light of Pro se naming ‘City of New York Taxi and Limousine Commission’ as the principal defendant/respondent superior, it’s a fact of law that is not accurate with the chain on correspondence between the Plaintiff, the respondents and the Court. This technicality cannot count against the plaintiff given the plaintiff’s corrections of this error in the first notice of complaint, so served in 2010. That the principal defendants going back to 2010 its City of New York as one of the principal defenders, City of New York Taxi and Limousine Commission as a major actor whose role is within the choosing of the City of New York its principal parent. The defendants included the Joes and Janes in clearing degrees of their function with the City of New York and the State of New York. It is the argument of this plaintiff that the technicality of City of New York Taxi and Limousine is an error preserved by the Clerk of court, that it also seem that whosoever prepared the case for the judge did not intend the judge to see the corrections as mentioned by the Plaintiff, for if the use of City of New York Taxi and Limousine has remained till March 31ST 2014, there is no way the plaintiff would have continued with his letters for a date with the Court or that the third Amended Complaint would have not carried the error. We look at the

The Court Order and Memorandum clearly stated that the City of New York Taxi and Limousine Commission is not a suable entity, and it is not impossible to deny that failure to correct this Order will result in termination or dismissal of justly initiated lawsuits by the State and Federal legate attorneys. But the corrections have been effected ever since (2010) and the corrections regarding the date and review are also forced to conform to State and Federal Standard. Therefore, there are material reasons for the dismissal which could be the Plaintiff, unless the Court is lying to itself, this process does not have to travel to the land of questionable technicality given the official and State made process well established for cases like this.

Your Honor, the Plaintiff have been duly informed that Rights of a Pretrial Detainee falls under 14th Amendment and that the Plaintiff risk further damages to his Rights under 4th Amendment which is borderline for Summary Judgment, a motion he, the Plaintiff must make at some point. That the Plaintiff should raise the issue of Sua Sponte, given its Comparative Association to Bad Acts (Rule 106), even the Judge has rejected the argument by both parties. No Court they mentioned would look at the Summary Judgment fairly if the onus falls on the Plaintiff over the flimsy issue of signature or lack of paper process as opposed to the more pressing issue of Neglect and Court Contempt by defendants who for nearly 8 months did not respond to a motion. If the court did not provide the summonses as the Judge Sandra Towne once mentioned, the Court must recognize the right initiative of the Plaintiff who sent his official copy to the defendant on Feb 10th, 2011.

Your Honor, U.S.C.A 28, Rule 106, seeks that arguments of this nature should consider 'completeness doctrine' which clearly opposes the introduction of written document  if quoted out of context, that 'full exposition of the documents' was the just requirement of the Court and any law. The Plaintiff must indicate that the discussions on the document would eventually arise, but he torches the precinct of Enabling Acts, that he is within the Threshold of the Federal Court to secure his statement, and this case is in the Eastern District and had been since November 22, 2010, that there is sufficiency of argument....That as far Queens Criminal Court and General U.S Court procedure, the plaintiff that he is entitled to the smallest benefits of the law, since the District did not perform him the right duty of Speedy Trial nor avail the Plaintiff their duty in rendering any Judgment against the State until the case empire in the Court. The Plaintiff didn't question the assumption of the Court, or understood why the Judge Brandt was doing at the time.

In seems clear to the Plaintiff that Judge Brandt and the Queens Criminal Court were aware of their duty to enter Judgment against the State since it gives the Plaintiff, Sampson Iroabuchi Onwuka, a special privilege by matter of law which also wills its remedy. 28 U.S.C Rule 52 (c), indicated that "if during a trial without a jury a party has been fully heard on an issue and the court finds against the party on that issue, the court may enter judgment as a matter of law against that party with respect to a claim or defense that cannot under the controlling law be maintained or defeated without a favorable finding on that issue, or the court may decline to render any judgment until the close of all evidence.

Such a judgment shall be supported by finding of fact and conclusions of law as required by subdivision (a) of this rule." But this so called 'Equity Rule 701/2', regarding the 'Findings of Fact and Conclusion of law', applies in many States of the Federation but not in the State of New York. State of New York requires prove of evidence and material witness, and in some extreme cases prove of probable course, as such the prosecutors for the sake of State of New York Law, purposely kept quite over their allegation since the Queens Court would not act outside the lines of contention that there was in fact the connection of the State of New York to the City of New York through the Court system. This view compounded the problems of the Plaintiff, to the degree that he was snatched from Public by false application of law, which is Sadistic, and given the impossibility of convicting the Plaintiff without even the material witness, it was a malicious prosecution.

Yet the Queens after thirty days had the right protected by Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to throw away any allegations without evidence, especially a case that as so pending on evidence. Above 'facts finding' by Court as prerequisite for entering judgment, the incident may or may not work in other States were pretrial was not trial, but in the State of New York a 'Pretrial is tantamount to Trial' as such Federal Law and Civil Procedure has preeminence. As such Partial Judgment which would save the plaintiff from the 'future damages' was also denied the Plaintiff and he went to on to incur the ruinations before and after the facts.

It was a classic case of Intentional Infliction of emotion distress (IIED), despite the fact that this proves leads to different ends of lawful remedy. The Plaintiff believes that it is safe to indict the court on abuse of process and usual kidnap of power, since the measure of power and privilege is the numinous equivalent of a tort into realms of equity pro-piece. The leverage for this sort of transfer would be a cardinal non-entity of a derelict, a graft in logic that trims the arcana of reasoning in the 14th Amendment regarding pretrial summation with a reversal through 5th Amendment, where the Crux of the issue may be in the 4th Amendment, torched by the 2nd and its preamble, the plaintiff unjust detention and actuary of the police was not justifiable contamination.  Perhaps in law, Cartesian derelict of contamination of the accused by stay for many reasons but may be answerable to the Court when an Oath is taken, that the issue of error or mistaken identity assumes the parsimony of the patronage or usurpation of power when the court begins to act out of law during delay and fatigue of process application. Such deliberate or neglected process is 'righting of legal wrongs' within the shadow of discretion estimable through the recommended duration of the hearing.

It is therefore too difficult to come around this new demonstration that the said Plaintiff at the time of the incident did not constitute any form of challenge to the City, or the State of New York, ab initio, could not have survived since the private corporation was involved in the execution of process that were beyond their capacities as those not suable. It merit a booking remark to threw direct light on what the Judge, and this Court would be expected to explicate when the Plaintiff did not have such controlling influences as his past record at the time of incident.  If the estrangement by the ‘unsuable entity’ was given the benefit of understanding, the whole allegation process and witnessing when so discovered to have been rented from a certain member of their organization, would have had a closure if not on Day 1 after the jail incident, but also Day 1 following the removal of the case to Circuit 6.      

Yet the interments of these few correspondences between the Plaintiff and the Court suggest that these Orders and Memorandum has been met to the last paragraph and more than once hacking back to earlier periods of the hearing. For if we compare notes from the Court and the letters to the Plaintiff by Court and controlling clerks at Eastern District of Brooklyn, there is a gap that may only require the direct approach to broach, hence the mislabel of the Plaintiff’s justly initiated action would have seen the light of Court were not for other matters needing the Court attention.

Whatever may be the binding reasons why we may not progress with the initiative, it is hardly a thing to draw blood for, but the dismissal could not have addressed the problem, especially for the problems of clarity which either the Court or a clerk who refuse to correct the title of Respondent; City of New York Taxi and Limousine Commission in spite of the many efforts made by the Plaintiff in showing that the corrections were long made and preserved, should not return especially when it appears at a face level of the official docket sheet at the Court and Clerk Room for Self-Represented or Pro Se. Her magistrate Judge Lois Bloom on seeing the heading alone would be persuaded to ignore the rest of the piece. For all common and driven opinions, there are degrees of dismemberment involvement curios Pro Se papers, who failed to head the direction of the Order and Memorandum – assuming this is the case – that such obvious technicality was inviolable before the law and therefore a pressing strategic turn off.

When this is the case, there is nowhere anyone or any attorney – in spite of the diorama efforts and merits of the case – would prevail for any sort of hearing since the Judge assigned the case would have looked elsewhere. The person or persons introducing radio-active elements in the overall paper works could not have the Judge, may or may have been the Court Clerk, but there are lengthy history about the Federal Supreme Court at Brooklyn that runs deep in Benjamin Caruso whose grandson is the City defender. But it is not a privilege to endure the capacity of the Eastern District or its controlling primus inter alia in such a case, but on the light of the privileges that could emerge from cases against the City and the State of New York which were initiated in good faith and good standing in law but for technical reasons are said to constitute deniability to the open decorum of those who once responded to the inquest that they can make the arguments to have re-instate the redemption for their own private purposes.  

U.S.C.A 73 A F P D 4th – 32, S.D.N.Y 1997 (Babi Ali v. City of New York, 977 F. Supp. 268; Fincher v. County of Westchester 979 F. Supp. 989. ; Velasquez v. City of New York, 960, F. Supp. 776.; Mazza v. Hendrick Hudson Cent. school; special attention >*S.D.N.Y 1996 Wu v. City of New York, 934 F. Supp. 581. S.D.N.Y 1995, where the resolution is so stated that "Elements of malicious prosecution claim under &1983 are same because elements of &1983 claim are borrowed from the State law. 42 U.S .C .A &1983.”

Lopez v. City of New York, 901 F. supp….To establish malicious prosecution claim under New York law and &1983, plaintiffs must establish; defendants commenced criminal proceedings against them; proceedings terminated in Plaintiff's favor, no probable cause existed for proceedings; and defendant with actual malice. At, 42 U.S.C.A & 1983, Lopez v. City of New York, 901.F. Supp. 084.., S.D.N.Y 1995; Dukes v. City of New York, 879 F. supplementary 335. Infra (United Stated Code Annotated) 1990 Dukes v. State of N.Y. 743 F. Supp. 1037 against State; Dukes v. State of New York, 743 F. Supp. 1037; against individuals.

S.D.N.Y "Elements of Tort - of malicious prosecution are commencement, or co-termination of criminal proceeding by defendants against Plaintiff. Termination of proceeding in favor of accused, absence of probable cause for criminal proceeding, and actual malice. The Plaintiff should request the maximum of money he wants must signs and date his amended complaint. (M.C. vs. McGuiness), sign, and date the Second Amendment.

Basis of the 1983 lawsuits., the right to wave preliminary hearing, couldn't have come from the defendants since, the Plaintiff - had requested the out of information to complete the partial 'easy half of the completeness theorem' which was filed by the Console and the interim private attorney including the Plaintiff represented until they parted ways over the issue of narrow fees.

If for instance the Federal Speedy Trial Act, (A preliminary hearing must notionally be done in 30 days of time. The delay could not be contingent on the Plaintiff, since there was a video tape involved.  Besides the point which the plaintiff has already made, the Preliminary hearing has already taken place. 

The Question is what exactly takes place in a preliminary hearing?

The persecution starts the hearing by notionally putting witness on the stand to testify about what happened, what he or they saw and what they heard, and by introducing one or more pieces of physical evidence to buttress on their hearing. This supposed hearing took place within the early days of the hearing but has far from Court Standard going by the absence of the major or principal witness or witnesses for the prosecution. Technically the hearing from absence of the Plaintiff ended the same day and if additional recourse is derived from the lack of activity from the Prevailing Party, they have a clause up to a thirty day, and less than two weeks when and if the primary of evidence is not provisioned for or arguments for its delay mentioned.

In the instance that a citing judge pushing a case beyond the 30 days – especially a case contingent of Evidence or substantive witness which the defense petitioned for – it is only a 'probable cause' demonstration of hold by the defendants or ‘probable cause’ allegation material from the description of either party. Wherefore, one party cannot prevail on the other or mere insinuation and from a hearing without smoking guns, the opposing party has the benefit of law to remake a presence when the evidence is yet to be obtained. At length, this Day 1 to other days that prosecuting party is absent, a Court attempting to show moderation in proclaiming of the law and restrain in from  playing public defender – clearly not the role of the Court and in précis serving the bad role of public executioner, such a court would otherwise dismiss a hearing without further consideration.  

The Second Circuit Court also stated that at the level of the pretrial arguments, the ‘prosecutors had to only show 'probable cause', in order to meet the goals of pretrial offers. This also was not case. That is only show ‘probably cause’, not even to the limits of evidence or testimonial entete of the main witnesses, and they flunked it. This Court where courageously bound by the Constitution and by the Courts at any level to purge the dismal case from contaminating this Plaintiff let alone the improbable conduct of the Court House. This Court flunked it, the Court flunked First Amendment Speech provisions by forcing the plaintiff from witnessing after the Day 1, flunked the barring limits of its unprotected judicial property rights for newly appointed Judges, flunked the procedural recourse of any new item in court pretrial when new facilities are introduced.

The Court flunked the signal to end the case as petitioned by the Plaintiff. It could have only amounted to illegal and indirect confiscation of the defendant – this Plaintiff – achieved and legal also achievable through indirect delay or process and failure of the Court to dismiss a case and prosecution with high probity for prejudice and low probity for malice. The flunk the process, by carrying on a case and atrial that has no merit to the Court ab initio, and would have not given any provisions to plaintiff in names of any reasons for the delay saving for conspiracy ipso facto.  For such extreme prejudicial action saving the usurpation of power and priori other than law this plaintiff was guilty before been guilty. The hearing did not survive a pretrial could not have made to Circuit 6 ipso facto.  

 ….'is to hear and test evidence' - especially in matter of allegations

The target and goal is to throw out weak cases, and to 'protect the rights of the accused' (6) Here even a simple opinion do count, mere 'probable cause' is enough, and that alone can determine the 'probative value' of evidence. (4) Defendants - can be even be "bound of over" (for trial a different and previous change'. (5) That the case was flagged to a misdemeanor - suggest the court saw the overzealousness of the prosecution, yet imperiled by process. They did nothing. It would mean that they did something in their past, or have a history of sparing anyone, or the allegations involving assault on a police or whatever argument. That the said organization went as far as absconding after allegations is material grounds for dismissals – at least on barest possible limits of law. To that wanton effect and similar outrages leading to unconstitutional revocation of a means of living, a working dynamic injury with futuristic consequence of doing more than ruins to the Plaintiff, suggest more than conspiracy, it torches the reasons why the Judge Brandt refused to dismiss the allegation material. To the point of actions within the facts of reasonable, it is the Plaintiffs believe that he was spared by a forgotten piece of evidence – the Video Tape.

Even "submit on the record", “motion for a speedy trial" 'motion in limine' at the very beginning – was denied and more than one by the Judge. The judgment is with the court.

(Memorandum of point and Authority, to bar none), one might include that in spite of the injuries people suffer from any form court process, there has always been the case. No officer had the right to detain you on mere hunch > 'Stills a Nash' in the first place.t. 1900. "Articulable facts supporting a reasonable suspicion" (United States v. Hemsley U.S.S sup. Ct., 1985). Since the initial detention was improper, the first incident to that detention was in improper and the fruits of the frisks are inadmissible"

Reasonably grounds for detaining of one, reasonable expectation of purely - ,'arraignment' or 'initial appearance', entering the arresting Payton v. New York, U.S Supp.  And for Vactions in rein, possessory, petitionary and partition actions on limitation of liability…may be measured by one theme question; was the district Court powerless to handle the three allegations? 

Governments’ interest including the functions involved and the field and administrative burdens that have additional or substitute procedure requirement would entail that the appointment so meeting for a District Court will by occlusion set in such a way that separates politics from policies hence the origins of Mandamus. In one straight answer, yes the District Court by finicky contrarian invocations of Judiciary Act 1789 and the conduit role of Law in administration of justice, can claim that her appointment was justifiable indication that she can handle all cases in court and that allegations meted against a plaintiff was allegations and not so much, that for and in the interest of Court and not necessary a private, and as well in future, actions pursuant to the welfare of the plaintiff and against the Plaintiff, the Court had more than omission of rules to account for the failure to recognize his history of the hearing and pleading.  C/C Evans-Morgans, W.D Wis. 2003. () F. supp. 20. 1440. Constitutional law - 278.

When from allegations we measure the end of law, it is too clear that a seating judge at any level is well placed and for said reasons appointed to react or motion for rephrasing such end of law and indictment, that equal party rule is not exception that as fitting the demands of a case that fumbled at opening day, the Judge has the dicta of superior knowledge to dismiss wrongful allegation even from first day. But this was not the case.

To many degrees that failure of the Court and the Judge to act is proven then and in earlier years of these Court processes to be entirely radioactive to the expectation of legal trial, that there is hardly any failure from denying that any plausible outcomes of such allegations would materialize a favor of the plaintiff should land in the trial or in the case in the considerations at Judge Towne office and Chamber partners, that even in the most opulent of light of not-guilty, there are less that easy chance of breaking even with the law and process.

The immateriality of such an outcome is no longer the premise of law and court, no doubt outside that which is becoming of a judge, it is partial on a first through third tier, it is prejudicial entailment of logic, it is expected to land the plaintiff for other reasons – perhaps conspirator – a not without persecution.     

When “allegation do not satisfy prosecution”, and further proscription within the limits of law should come to an end. Therefore the prosecution with or without intent of landing the criminal, is answerable to the Court through the 5th Amendment and through evidence and at least eye witnesses, that failure of the Court to dismiss frivolous allegation material may amount to questionable matters after the Judge’s appointment which and without which he or she may freely prevail as the final dicta of every case and hearing, that end result of so long a delay as no wise explicable as deliberate, and therefore not an unanswerable delay of ‘administrative of justice’, it is a ‘waste of time’ and ‘public inconvenience’ to the degree that when no real measures were taken to absorb the said individual from harm, would be reduced to a lesser of the two errors that he or she as the Plaintiff must be redeemed for such infringement on his economic welfare.

The law says so and therefore and it is true that when this is the case, “Private rule will be affected by official action” of the Court, that when the Court so chooses to accommodate ‘Transferred Intent’, It recognizes or may be argued to recognize that ‘Defamation and Invasion of privacy, False Light, Breach of confidence, Abuse of process, Malicious Prosecution, Alienation of affection, Scope of Res ipsa Loquitor...’ were easy half of encompassing of the law and process of the law that needed no second guessing. Delay or denial fast track rule is a risk to execution of process unless there are other matters holding the Judge against his or her active duly office, as an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedure used, and he probable used, and the probable value, if any of additional or substitute procedure is measured from half the time of the damages, runs the risk of abuse of Court process and the general US Court. Above all, when the prosecution do not intent on meeting the accused even half way in Court, it is malicious prosecution because the law says so.

The Court must advice members of the Jury that the Plaintiff's license and only Source of living was taken away at the same that he was taken to jail and then to Court. That the primary agency knowing fully well that the Plaintiff was innocent prosecuted him with no apparent reason saving from malice and from matters arising….

“On May 4, 2012, after obtaining several extensions of time in which to file his second amended complaint, plaintiff filed a 136-page pleading. The second amended complaint no longer named the TLC as a defendant, but named ten new defendants: the State of New York; the City of New York; its mayor, Michael Bloomberg; the former and current Commissioners of the TLC, a TLC attorney and four other individuals. However, the pleading contained so much extraneous material as to make it impossible to discern plaintiff's claims. By letter dated May 24, 2012, Corporation Counsel again requested that this Court dismiss the action pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for failure to comply with the Court's orders. See Letter to Hon. Sandra L. Townes from Asst. Corp. Counsel Steven M. SIlverberg, dated May 24, 2012.”

I, Sampson Iroabuchi Onwuka; the Plaintiff, move to re-instate the case between Sampson I. Onwuka versus the State of New York, City of New York, and the Does and Janes of New York City and State, for stated reasons of the clerk’s omission and commission and for actions that are not defended by the constitution and the Court, to which the Constitution and the Court is bound by it, and they are not individual assessments. The fitting accounts of the incident from the offices involved is well rehearsed in previous correspondences, the capacity of the individuals and their offices were discoursed including their official capacitance in all the Complaints made by the plaintiff, without which the allegations cast suspicious light on the Plaintiff or in this light, the defendant who has been failed by the activities of the Clerk cannot infer judicial inactivity.

But this also not the case, for such a case would mean a class action of some sort where invocation of the law may easily buttress for and against the baying parties. What is this case? It is a matter of actions that proved prejudicial in practice to the Plaintiff that was enacted with cunning that outsiders of the practice would not guessed what happened. This is a case of moral depravity of the role of the high court in this day and age in wrestling down the administrative variation of these Courts in the United whose duties and performance of function is not essentially giraffe. It is a case about an individual unable to overcome the damages wrought by a City and an by an Empire State; State of New York, where the actors of law and New York Municipality are also encouraged to continue their process of denial, that it seems easy to match an American on the ground for the personal gratifications that comes with official capacity. It will be considered irresponsible…..

That despite Judge Sandra L. Towne's rule to strike down the Plaintiff's Fed.55 by Rule 12 as within the legal perimeter for 'failure to state a claim...', that it is fair to argue that the terrible half of the Rule 12 'lack of subject-matter jurisdiction' did not compromise Plaintiff's Fed. 55, or breach the gap between the Plaintiff and law. The plaintiff, Sampson Iroabuchi Onwuka, does not expect a different result either, and he is not expected to have suggested that going forward he’s action will call for something else away from the Judge. However nonetheless, there are other items in the process that should lead to avenues of doubt and benefit of initiative. That one, that the trial went to Court and levered between what the Chief members of City of New York Taxi and Limousine Commission said, between what the City of New York Police Department may have believe happened, between what the prosecutors from the State of New York and City of New York were willing convict the plaintiff off, between the Court allegation process or day 1 through the remaining months and the Judge who must exercise reasons to have held the plaintiff for so long.

The incident assumes a different form, that form means something else that facts from their testimonies renders the case useless, that the reason to continue the allegation was of no consequence, that the Court has their reasons for holding the judge to comply and so comply that both the Judge and the law exceeded each other in spite of the impermissibility of private hunch and personal interest. There is something else, the process was so Machiavelli in its execution through delay that the Plaintiff would be robbed on State intervention when the hearings (which did not place) were not concluded. 

There are other matters, especially the incipient mislabel of Summary Judgment, which the City of New York – America’s most powerful City, State of New York – the Empire State – did accord the plaintiff in the long course of financially complicated losses. Yet in spite of the formidable argument made by the Judge on Rule 12, the Plaintiff wants to indicate that going solely on judgment as exercised from law, he should have been granted the benefit of summary judgment as exercised through (C) Fed 55. The Plaintiff however believes that Rule 12 is not a high standard, that the interpolation of the Assistant Counsel, Stephen Silverberg, of Rule 11 of not signing the 10-page complaint are reasons within the shadow of the Bad Acts of not responding to an inquest for nearly a year. The Defendants did not at any time say anything regarding his opinions, or is at the least…

Federal Supreme Court need to demonstrate its 'good faith' in the process by setting a time table for a new hearing to the benefit of the Plaintiff, understanding above all, that it is difficult to have delayed him and their prevailing.

To prevail on the Summary Judgment for uncontested precedence in the Court is a summary entailment of logic from purely legal threshold and it is within the clearing of the assigned Judge to proclaim so because the law says so. Whatever move is made to torpedo the basic element of the law should not be manifested in the deniability of a trial by Jury. But the Court the Actions to dismiss the case – in spite of the creative opportunity to allow the defendant who have given any reason for dismissal than petitions of unsigned documents, has not re-filing of the case which the honorable Judge Lois Bloom may have chosen to ignore – is why the last two attorneys may have dropped from handling the suit pursuit of the smallest benefit of law and protection. In command of the last papers from Judge Sandra Towne, it seems that the plaintiff would be required make two trips to two tailors towards a full representing of the case, whereas the denial through process had already happened at very junior level, that it looks from perspective that the Court is condoning recognitions of indicia without respect to the law, amounted to easy half of general persuasion and can launch attack based under the Color of State.

Your honor, the Plaintiff has never argued that the one-time incident which the respondent argued for is setting an acceptance tone that something was wrong with the City of New York and the State of New York, that the reactionary tendencies of defendant in implicating this one time scenario is not equal any judgment or dismissal of actions. That the Court is above all saving the very element of the Court appointed by the people, who cannot exist without the law which above all or besides all, makes clear that even those who like Silverberg is considered attorneys at all, cannot at this level enjoy anymore privilege than the pro se, that law is paramount and those who proclaim the law are touted in the process, as law proclaimers which is part of the framing process and therefore inviolable by only one act.

That the respondent and defendant ‘City of New York and State of New York’ with representatives Steven Silverberg, who affixed the attention with the glued emphasis on ‘Pro Se’ as underlined was suggesting too much.

That it is self-represented shy from the earliest incarnation and, idle invocations of the set piece hearing. It would have taken extra-ordinary level of legal maturity that expose the weaknesses of the one-time premise, evidence of which is the yeomanry of the Plaintiff, that it was entirely exception to precedence that he was able to relocate the argument made for and against the one-time piece by the former Supreme Court Judges. That citation in itself, was sufficient reasons to consider the Plaintiff’s Complaints from a supposedly vintage that the individual concern is seeking redress and redemption, that these passed Judges who insisted that in so far as the Seventh Amendment was concerned, that all cases decided in the favor of the Defendant are entitled remedy trials. That the instance of one-time premise is understood and handled by the time of the hearing and privilege through maturity of the prosecutions is not saved. This is where the attorney came in and where they left off.

Those cases involving suggest a lengthy duration, sufficient to assuage fair and foul rule, that a withdrawal of the prosecution would have eased and sufficed arguments of compensation. It is not beyond any party to press what they lost – for instance lost wages – it is not beyond the court either to strip-tease on this errors in the process of justly initiated process, that they are corrected within the permissible period of prosecution.  When we encounter in this case that it expired in the court or died a natural death, it is beyond dispute that premise of illegality, absconding after bamboozle, prosecution with no intention to convince and convict, that the Court’s actions was general parsimony to side and decide a hearing before the Court, that it couldn’t have persuaded and proceeded any other way than with direct and indirect understanding of the enigma and matrix of the Queens Court.

Given the prevailing problems associated with the suit, the whole process could not have been a patronage dismissal in the lower court, that a reason exist why the hearing made it to Queens Court from the beginning, a separate reason exist on why the hearing was sustained through the barking and trade tackles at the 1st Day, and why for all intent, this plaintive was denied access outside the Country has its legal reasons, why his was under some guarding about the dismissal process. You honor, the plaintiff’s attorney on the Day I in court did not make from White Plains New York, and was considering taking on the case saving for additional fees which I didn’t understand. It was going to be a weird case given the clause affixed by the persecuting regarding the blow suffered by the Plaintiff which was countered by the Defendant as being the injured party. Yet a case of that nature which did not merit a hearing, made it that far, far enough to allow new impressions of the case and the eager prosecution to enter this case and the hearing sometime later. There is confusion, we are lead to accept that the role of the Judges were to ‘proclaim the law’ and nothing, that they play deciding roles in the outcomes of any hearing, that any case – if not all cases can be decided by the Clerk.

To the degree that such things happen every day and people use means outside public access to exercise their wish by pinching on their reserves, we compare what advantages could actually benefit the objections and the High Standard in a beginning process in spite of the Judge’s knowledge that the Plaintiff was only partially advised by attorneys, that there are overtime, the questions of administration of fees.

The Judge is well aware of the fact that the City or the State of New York do encourage public defenders in private affairs, or are there many Chambers who are qualified to present a suit at the Federal Court.

The only population that enter with precedence to precinct of Federal Supreme Court are those with equal and direct affinity to the case or so constitute the injured party, that these individuals may choose assistance on the Presenting of the legal papers, that also bound to the process by affinity of the third (the representative) torching the second (the family) and the pyramid by permission touching the first (the plaintiff). The constipation of legal hearing or the obesity of the actions from both the Court houses and the defenses is shown clearly stated by the dates, some of which carry a different address but it seems that all of the statement made by the Judge and by the Clerk were not contented in their reaction to the Plaintiff. The matter of fine and time of inquest, is in showing that it the automatic application of very automatic process requires a new face, that in showing before the law and the People of New York, that the Judge could not apply the stipulated laws for whatever her reserves and whatever the reserves of the assigned Judge Lois Bloom, does not compromise the plane legal say ‘that if the laws says so it wills so’.

Above all the City of New York and the State of New York should be better trained to deal with the consequences of actions taken when 'probable cause' was not established, and when Plaintiff was more detained for no useful reason. This plaintiff believes may offer additional recourse to matters of adverse effect and future recovery. The family of the Plaintiff which is half the percentage injury…Pursuant to Rule 55(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil procedure "for failure to plead or otherwise defend the above - captioned action as fully appears from the Court file herein". The Plaintiffs claim for declaratory and injunctive relief are authorized by 28 U.S.C & 2201 - 2202 and Fed R. C.V. p.5.

Based on the Actions of the said individuals, and the incident from the information between him, the Plaintiff and the Court, the Plaintiff seeks to widen his argument based on what is left of the law, that here as the lead case against defendants, Rule 11, Rule (b) is notable, "measured as of 26" is applied for this matter, it incurs obligation on the part of the Court and the defendants towards the Plaintiff, and that he is made by the actions of the Court at the STATE SUPREME COURT to file or fill the demands for "presenting" that the allegations which was filed 'against' the Plaintiff at the Queens County, was abandoned by the defendants on recognizing the presence of a Video. That Plaintiff was tainted by the said allegation and he sought to remove the allegation from his records but all to no avail. The delay made life impossible for him and his family. The allegations were not true and the individual was subjected to long spells of detention, Search and Seizure. No Ambulance in spite of his injury and shocks.

Circumstance justifying a warrantless Search the Court have often distinguished between home or office and a vehicle. The law concedes that the vehicle may never be seen again; as such it is incident to exception, the 'automobile exception'. However searches conducted publicly and in an office and at home. Searches are done pursuant to consent. The relative body of case law and legal and law accommodations particularly lay assumptions of risk, which the plaintiff at the time of the arrest did not share.

The Plaintiff insist of clarifying this fact since the request by defendant that the Court should 'Sua Ponte' dismiss the Law Suit was a wrong application of process and a standing on "Rule 14". Reason being that the Defendant/s, State of New York and City of New York, did not for a whole year respond to the Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, dated Feb 10th, 2011, and only did so when the Plaintiff, Sampson Iroabuchi Onwuka, sought Judgment by Default pursuant to Rule 55 as transferred to "Rule 12".

The second Reason why the Plaintiff believes that application of 'Rule 14' sought by the defendants was wrong is that the level that the case has attained was beyond the category of 'evidential showing', that the facts are quite clear that the Plaintiff was merely recovering from long and tedious cycles of Criminal Procedure, hearing have been done in the Queens County Court. In essence, the Federal Court, particularly the Eastern District, who reviewed the Legal Initiative undertaken by the Plaintiff, Sampson Iroabuchi Onwuka, did not think it improper that he should be heard or that Justice should be pursued.

That it was already beyond the Queens County Court since the Court has formally dismissed a wrongful allegations. In a sense, 'Sua Ponte' could not apply, when the facts speak for themselves 'Rex Judicata' and could not have been pursued by the Defendants since the Plaintiffs suits are made after the facts of the Court hearing. The evidence to the hearing incident is well preserved by the Court. The Plaintiff believes that he should have pointed these facts out in his response to the motion to dismiss but he is not an attorney neither is the defendant unaware of it, hence a short incursion of purpose restriction by the Court is greater demand.

Noting with force, that U.S.C 28, Rule 105 on Federal Rules of Evidence 1-408, that "Trial Court is not required to give Sua Sponte limiting instruction, following introduction of Bad Acts evidence, that such evidence is to be considered only as to his having committed charged crime, when Bad Acts are introduced into evidence by defendant rather bringing up mater is minimize prior Bad Acts, and giving of instruction would undercut that purpose by emphasizing them." U.S v. Brawner, C.A.D. 1994, 32 F. 3d 602, 308 U.S Appl. D.C 212.

By this statement, the Plaintiff believes that the spontaneous process required evidence of Bad Acts, and since this Acts are missing from the Plaintiff's Initiative, the Defendants were admitting their Bad Acts from day one. As such the issue of Sua Sponte yields a 'test of process', and by that citation, your honor, the defendant reduced their guilt to the barest minimum, compounded their damages to the Plaintiff and if the Court is unwilling to inveigh against this ruthless approach, then the Defendants are beyond the law or amounts to Exception to the Rule.

The word Exception to the Rule is a legal term, and as they courts knows, it can only apply when citations of Bad Acts are introduced by the Plaintiff as evidence, as binding prove of Negligence. If this theme is exception, there is nothing to hide from Plaintiff's desire to redeem his image by citing the exceptional circumstances that led to the presence of your honor. For sure, pleading that the defendants made the Plaintiff an exception entails a burden of Prove, since the territories of Municipal Laws are incurred, it seems a damage to the Violation of the Plaintiff’s 14th Amendment - being above all the Chief indigene of the Bad Acts performed by City Workers than the State, and in matter of logic if not law, exceptional circumstances provides a blanket to the 14th Amendment.

Particularly speaking and equally at stake, is the U.S.C.A Amend. 14 with due note to 34, concerning Administrative Segregation, undue and unnecessary pretrial detention, prison exposure and prisoners generally welfare and tarnish, that 'Allegations by Prose pretrial detainees that they were punished prior to being sentenced by their placed in restrictive confinement' was a meeting Standard for this case since it bears on what happened to the Plaintiff on October 22nd, 2007, where he was restrained for hours before the Court issued what now looks like an arrest warrant.

Judge’s Account

“In a memorandum and order dated July 24, 2012, but filed on July 25, 2014—Onwuka v. Taxi Limousine Comm'n, No. 10-CV-5399 (SLT)(LB), 2012 WL 3043202 (E.D.N.Y. July 25, 2012) (the "Third M&O")—this Court disregarded Corporation Counsel's request and granted plaintiff yet another opportunity to amend his pleading. In that Third M&O, this Court again provided guidance on how to prepare a complaint and provided plaintiff with the number of the Pro Se Office. The Court also took pains to explain why the Second Amended Complaint was inadequate, stating, inter alia:”

There was no such papers filed on July 25th 2014. The plaintiff at this point was in Austin Texas and could not have written any such papers let alone file one.

“[T]he second amended complaint is far too lengthy and prolix. As this Court noted in the Second M&O, a complaint "should contain only a short, plain statement of the facts and should not be interspersed with comments and opinions." Second M&O at 7. Moreover, the complaint should contain only allegations. There is no need to substantiate those allegations at this juncture; to quote from or cite to legal authorities, such as statutes and cases; or to address potential defenses, such as qualified immunity or collateral estoppel.”

Third M&O at 6; 2012 WL 3043202, at *4. The Court then granted plaintiff permission to file a third amended complaint but warned:

“The Third Amended Complaint should follow the format described in the Second M&O and discussed in more detail in this Memorandum and Order.... If plaintiff fails to file his Third Amended Complaint within the time allowed, or fails to following [sic] the specific directions set forth in this, and prior, orders, this Court may dismiss this action without further notice to plaintiff.”

Third M&O at 7; 2012 WL 3043202, at *5.

Equitable…

In the opening accounts of the information that was presented to the plaintiff, which he took his time to respond to the Court on what was called Second Amended Complain, the Plaintiff did not make Taxi Limousine Commission the principal respondent superior, did not even use the tag Taxi and Limousine Commission as part of the Defense, his prosecution so stated says, CITY OF NEW YORK, STATE OF NEW YORK, et al, in their individual capacities to the Superior being by law and because the law says so, the Mayor of the City of New York, were considered part of defendant and not New York Taxi and Limousine Commission who are not suable entity.

The Second Amended Complaint and the resubmitted Second Amended Complain which the Court did not consider a Third Amended Complain because it didn’t ask for one, cover these areas of import; Prerogative Writes, Certiorari/Review - (Certiorari) - judicial review considering 1928 and 1983 as basis one of the initiation, the politics from polices hence the argument on the mandamus and limits of the Court applicability of process which is not limited to a higher Court directing a lower court. Covers the exceed of legal bounds of the lower court or usurpation of power for failure to dismiss as a case that should not have made it court in the first place, citing the remediation power of the Supreme Court which has power to restore the 'Status quo ante' of the Plaintiff and irreparable attempt to much of his will. The Second Amended Complaint also covers Injunction, Specific Performance of the Capacities involved from City of New York; State of New York and to the individual Joes and Janes in their capacities for the municipal authorities so mentioned. Covered the Account of Profits from losses pursued for redemption or elsewhere for the City of New York and the State of New York as against the City of New York, that rescission intention and prognostication was deliberate indigenes of the conspiratorial process since the judge was not an amateur and the Court was his or her property going by the tag of Assistant Judge of Queens County, that munificence of the said property not yet hers was not the same benevolence given the many options available at the legal carrier make way for a grossly ridiculous hearing even with the absence of Brady materials and high prejudice and low probity for the said Plaintiff.

It also covers the plaintiff’s stated position in the 1983 which limited application and initiation of suit to Declaratory relief which leads to actionable process, rectification when and if necessary as limited by the power of the seating judge and those who nudge her pecking process, dealing also the equitable estoppel by the absentia performed with delicate intent by the defendant which would have been better for both parties where the allegation dismissed as said by law or so true for and because the law says so, and that failure to so was in such contempt of court – pursued by the court orders and memorandum and so to speak…a disruption of proceeding through poor behavior and poor showing as from contempt of court given either the expectation of Judge’s action in such a case or what the law limits for her action through such a case.

In such a case as these, the marginal facts seethes with lasting example on the real social consequence on the plaintiff, or none, since revocation of powers available or would be, that there is informed process which need to be revisited that could have saved the plaintiff much injury, personal and psychology harm, financial losses and loss of family member, including the State and the City of New York, had the Assistance district Attorneys of Queens Court and the seating Judge and Bench, including the State and now the Supreme all the expenses if the least consideration of the law was permitted in process. For such process or least consideration of the law including timely removal of the case or pertaining to Fast Track Rule would have no doubt led to the dismissal – early dismissal of a hearing that was not even signed by the City and States prosecutors.

As a direct and proximate result of the acts or omissions of the defendants identified in this complaint and the other unidentified persons acting jointly, each of the plaintiff’s family has suffered monetary and personal harm, including deprivation of constitutional rights of the said Plaintiff under the First and Fourth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and the Due Process Clause, that the loss of liberty so highlighted and so related to suffering and harm, and violation of state and common law rights to be free of unlawful arrest and false imprisonment determined to the highest probably and actual and undeniable extent, ruined and damaged the plaintiff over the consequent 6 years from 2007, that the he continues to be damaged publicly and in person through opinions which are hardly legal to his career given the drawdown on the Court’s inactivity during the process and after.

Existence of a lawful order, (2) the Potential Contemnor's knowledge of the order (3) the Potential Contemnor's failure to comply, that these were either immunity or Acts of omission, pursuant to the Article (V) that 'No person shall be held against his will’ either for and procedural course of law or under the color or state, or in persons that are any point working for or against the interest of the Government or so described City ordinance and State Law.  In limelight of the use of Rule 8 of Federal Court process, we can insinuate the statement by above statement is routing position by the New York State procedural enactment of process, that some observer measuring the limits of this case in the context of the position, promotes the scenario as a wage between expectation from the police and those from the law,  bifurcating between the ends of municipal laws and the Plaintiff, he vies with U.S.C §§241 and 242,   the he "urge you to determine whether these actions constituted a deprivation of rights under color of law in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§241 and 242, whether the NYPD engaged in a pattern or practice of conduct that deprived individuals of rights protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States in violation of42 U.S.C. § 14141, and what can be done to prevent similar actions that violate people’s civil and constitutional rights under color of law in these and similar situations."

Of Course your honor, this is not the case, for contractual agreement is insignificant in this matter and hence easy accretion to Justice than the difficult and morally desponded case between a Powerful State; State of New York, and a Private; Sampson I. Onwuka. The pretension is that something happened to this private and probably not new, that in relation to others who do understand the basis on the Country or the depth of personal injuries or in some giraffe environment, these actions may be overlooked. But this is not the case.

Judge’s Account

“In mid-August 2012, this Court received a third amended complaint, bearing a handwritten title reading "Second Amended Complaint." That pleading appears to be almost identical to the second amended complaint. Indeed, the only apparent substantive difference between the two pleadings appears to be in the handwritten notations on the last page. The last page of the second amended complaint is dated April 15, 2012, while the last page of the third amended complaint states that it was "Resubmitted by Plaintiff Sampson Onwuka August 5th, 2012."

“In a letter dated August 21, 2012, Corporation Counsel renewed the request to dismiss this action pursuant to Rule 41(b). In that letter, Corporation Counsel noted:”

It may seem to suggest that the Judge did not place any emphasis on the legality of the case leading to the ultimate losses of the plaintiff and it may seem that the incidents regarding the date in question October 22, 2007, are matters which the Supreme Court has little or no interest on. It will seem that the role of the Supreme Court has meaning in the precinct of mandamus which they must perform or at least transfer the losses suffered by the Plaintiff to the inability of the District of Queens to dismiss a frivolous and high malicious prosecution.

It's not unheard off that any individual facing the polar end of a rogue treatment of law from which Plaintiff survived at the Queens Court where useful worked for or in the interest of Justice, will not go to the limits of the law to promote a highly justifiable case. It is not wrong to attempt to make a formal complaint on any formal grounds of this arguments about the left and right of the legal matters involved or so much as 1983, but to the main event of the incidents occurring on the day, October 22nd, 2007, we - the Plaintiff, barred by Supreme Court involvement in criminal investigation and by the Citizens prosecution of another.

These are facts from law, which has proof to show that the expectation of the Plaintiff is a just audacity of law, that it is common sense to add that failure of the Defendant to press through on the elements of the charges would suggest a hint of alienation from law and a form of forfeit. That it efforts between the Plaintiff rights to remedy and a threshold of defendant’s criminality, permeate the Merit of the Complaint and the limits of expectations.

Whereas, the Court mentioned that it is not their job to investigate the criminality of the incident and pursue the legal limits of the actions of those Americans operating ‘under the color of the State’ on the said day and after, and the Plaintiff is necessarily toeing the lines of Court process. The Court affirms that it is committed to pursuing ‘due process’ and remedy, it demands from the Plaintiff a remake of his 10 page initial complaint, and a remake of the Second Amended Complaint including the letters.

That it was concerned principally with the violation of the constitution, and rather seeks that both sides take their time to remedy the situation. Whereas the plaintiff has papered out his intent in the previous correspondences that he is forced by process to seek remediation, he is imperiled by process in obtain a useful hearing or legal representation.  

That if only something was done on the day, or something done during the court processes and after, the whole complication with the case would have been avoided, but for the fact that the Plaintiff was barred by the Court process on one hand at the Queens County Court and by choking of his primary source of living on the other hand by the “TLC” (New York City Taxi Limousine Commission), he suffered all kinds of losses with enough adverse effect and future damages to last for some time. That these actions are nothing compared to the damages of his businesses.

Judges’ Account

“Plaintiff . . . has now twice been warned that his failure to abide by previous Court Orders could result in dismissal. On each occasion, plaintiff's subsequent filing has been increasingly non-responsive to the Court's warnings and instruction. Accordingly, it is respectfully requested that the Court dismiss this action with prejudice pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b).”

Letter to Hon. Sandra L. Townes from Asst. Corp. Counsel Steven M. SIlverberg, dated Aug. 21, 2012, at 2-3.”

The Plaintiff argued from his Complaint that from going by what the whole process and the ridiculous presentation of his action at Court, that in spite of the fact that repeating the above predicate may help to market provisional authority of the Court in such a time as this, that by taking action on the plaintiff’s behalf, the Judge and the Court would not only be upholding the legislative intent of the Second Circuit, it will certify its authority of the Federal Court over the State. That a last form of resort in the most difficult of circumstance somehow ‘still’ exists in condemning excision from the law and provisional constitution for the Second Circuit in the name of law and order. The Court does not operate that way, has never operated that way, you have made the argument for your redemption. But there are exceptions.  

Acts from facts alone as those from the correspondences between the Plaintiff and the Court will prove to embrace that the Plaintiff has not changed his addressee and named defendants since the initial deposition, that he was and looking at the inevitability of recovery from his losses and not just the remedy but a possible prosecution of the individuals who perpetrated these acts. The Plaintiff has also maintained that the Recovery of his justly misplaced finances is not pursued in terms of its provisional Remedy in the law to remand offender; but are pursued from Remedy based entirely on U.S laws and for the common sense fact that the law is no respecter of persons as such the plaintiff’s private damages could not have been missed, that the business world continues in spite of him.

Whereas, the constitutional violations pointed out by the Plaintiff in his Second Amended Complaint and in Third Amended Complaint are laws enacted by U.S Congress and by the people of these United States enacted and by this State; State of New York, that via Seventh Amendment, all cases which was dismissed in Court for a day or and for any number of the reasons are cases that are subject to claims and to Remedy at the Court. The Plaintiff cannot pretend that he is not aware of the difficult changes associated with this claim, that as far as the 1983 he has attempted to get help where necessary especially the getting indictment on the deep influence with the law exercised in this case.  

Whereas seven of the Nine (9) seating Supreme Court Judges including late Justice Relinquent agree on the statement above that all cases which have seen the light of Court Action are subject to Remedy, that this position is guaranteed in the 7th Amendment. The two descents from the nine judges in agreeing to this case cited human facility and argue that the issue of human error is one insurmountable challenge towards the execution of duty under the Color of Statement. According to their argument, this error does not necessarily explain 'municipal principality' over any alleged case and therefore inappropriate as an onion for legal recourse and remedy. 'One incident' the opposing party including Justice Sandra O’Connor argued may constitute an error and cannot therefore serves as a major indigene of the 'municipal practice' or compromise of the actors of law or under the 'color of the state'.

But the rest of the Judges including some of the seating Judges from the Second Circuit adjudicated and maintained that there is something about the Last Chance to Act in the American Legal Jurisprudence that more than buries the issue of error and human facility, that while human facility may be involved in trespassing the Rights of a Private in the line of duty, the length of time leading to the Court and the duration of any hearing, arms the party or parties involved with enough time to withdraw their allegation or make the necessary amendments within the benefit of physical evidence  - when it applies as in the State of New York - or to the benefit of experience and when it applies with seating Judges that such Actors of Law and the alleged cases can be withdrawn or proceeded with due recourse to the law and the rights of the Plaintiff.  When this is not the case, ‘one incident’ theorem is compromised by time and relapse of duty.

The propensity towards the Last Chance is that Day 1 appearance in the Court involves an oath before a standing judge, involves degree panoply between the Chybraids of Legal precinct and the Scylla of legal Thresholds to be defended. When this is the case, there is nothing in the remaining versions of the American Legal practice that should save a prevailing over allegations of impropriety saving that of time.

Your Honor may also mention that from Honorable Sandra Towne’s July 24th, 2012, letter, we read her appraisal that in Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaints that "The Caption of the Second Amended complaint complies with his court's directives, listing ten defendants. However, in the body of the complaint, plaintiff provides a second list of defendants which includes four individuals - officers Atuegbu and Bonilla and two Doe Officer - who are not listed in the captain Second Amended Complaint at 73", No. 73 of the Index of the Second Amended Complaint, from whence she argued that all the officers involved in the process should be mentioned. The Clerk could not have missed that. Did the court miss the generality of the argument that….

 Your honor, there is serious confusion over what the Judge meant by the above citation. One can easily try to question the wisdom in using compliance in converting a case from the incidents at the office building of the City of New York Taxi and Limousine Commission, to a case of Remedy since the Honorable Towne in her first letters to the Plaintiff clarified that the Supreme Court do not meddle with issues of criminality of alleged affiant, are not interested in criminal persecution of any Citizen by another Citizen, that in matters of violations of clearly stated Federal Constitution, the Supreme Court of face level would consider Remediation or seek means to bridge the dispute between the parties involved. In some sense, there is hardly any use for rehearsing the incident that took place at City of New York Taxi and Limousine Commission at Queens New York, for if these parties had reasons to believe that even the merest shred of the allegation took place on the said day or after, they would have made some efforts to step their allegations at the Court. That the 5TH Amendment that is likely to order the punitive presenting of the material evidence was after the facts of the Day 1 in Court when they could not proceed from the stand point of evidence, without which the ass of the Plaintiff would be fried somewhere in the Jail.

The Allegations of the City of New York and State of New York as under the Action; PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, transferred by Law to actors of the State Representative and the City Mayor, would be to the merit of the incursion of the prosecutors, for all they had to do was present themselves as the team of prosecutor to be adjudged the ‘prevailing party’ which they did not, which means that the negligence of the Actors and their eager prosecution of the plaintiff were routine for a reason, and the continued negligence and court contempt since the incident is placing additional, transferred the difficulty of the Case and controlling influence to the Judicial Authority of the Court towards disabling the exercise of power by the Queens Court and Judge Brandt.

Of course she refused to end the case and had to perpetually adjoin a case without opposing motion even when the Prosecuting team was no longer at ease with the case, even from the fact that none of the prevailing party member was present, that the Plaintiff has very pressing International Affairs to attend. At this period and in later views of the processes involved during the private judicial canopy of City of New York Taxi and Limousine office, the said Plaintiff was not invited and yet they proceeded with decisions that militated against the Plaintiff primary Welfare and his source of living. The allegations were false and the incident of the Video was more than material reasons for any Judge to dismiss any case under 30 day rule of fast tract.  

The Judge will agree that any case now or in future, with or without the realms of recognition to continue or be sustained in the Court, a seating judge would have more than a common reason to continue with a case or any case beyond the absence of applicable rule of law, beyond the absence of evidence and absence of a prevailing party. Even to this plausibility, a judge who proclaims the law may opt to retain a case or pre-trial when a Defendant/Respondent has a record or any form of controlling precedence. Record is the court procedure, history is the law. These insuperable quantity are consequential in chain of relativity that the past has consequence on the present, the present is not without future consequences and a delay in understanding the full extent of the records of the respondent will suffice. But this is not the case.

This Plaintiff, Sampson Iroabuchi Onwuka, at the time of the Incident had none, saving occasional malfeasants; the plaintiff has no controlling effect on a case. At time of the incident did not understand then and even now how these Court proceeds. It is with trepidation and firmness of his August virtues that he was just able to hold his belt at the Day 1 in account, did not understand what he was charged with from the beginning and was perhaps saved from other instances of manipulation and now laughable coercion by the Persecutors, and after a long laundry list of what this plaintiff is expected to have done, the defense now plaintiff asked one question and cited another, the case crumbled.

39. The case was moved to Judge Brandt and for reasons which I cannot yet understand; the coffin to an opening day was reversed and reconsidered and the case applause to Circuit 6, itself a tough and long suffering Court room so organized that the defenders had no merit.  If the Judge Brandt had no extra interest in the matter and not acting in the interest of any Corporation, or acted under no duress from Unitary Entities such as City of New York Taxi and Limousine Commission or municipal authorities such as the City of New York and State of New York, if she had no one pressing force or dictating the case to her, she would have no reasons to have kept the case more than Day 2. Your honor, the second fact about the Indicia of Recognition before the Judge entails a Fifth Amendment or the Court is the other alternate reason why there is delay in the process. The more careless reasons would be the force of habit that accompanies the ‘Judicial Usurpation of Power’, which lend a pair of argument that some cases were already decided before assumption of procedure.  Some if not others were not to be entitled the least benefits of the Law and these accounts for something in this 21st century. 

What does it mean?

The person of interest with such Indicia of Recognition is a certain Anthony Holmes who for reasons authored best City of New York Taxi and Limousine Commission (the un-suable entity), testified on paper and through signatory that such an one as the Plaintiff, Sampson Iroabuchi Onwuka, a onetime defender of most punitive charges, was according to Anthony Holmes involved in dastardly social behavior resulting a plethora of damages at the office of City of New York Taxi and Limousine Commission on October 22nd , 2007, and this individual was at this time fully capable in his intellectual capacity to make his testimonials known to the court, said individual was well aware of the fact that the above mentioned entity was not suable, was well aware that the second half of the not-suable entity is that the so mentioned organization was by 1915 ordinance not permitted to prosecute a private on any count saving the infringement on normative social prescription or proven as such to be a menace to the society.

The latter rest on the judicial weight of the Court but to the facts of the arresting and the future estimate of prosecution; the said entity is not permission by the City ordinance to pursue their case because the entity involved in the litany of charges was not a ‘suable entity’. Since the Police was not available at the time of the incident till hours later, the indicia of recognition is therefore a stated agency and the persons of Anthony Holmes, who are they mentions in the intricate link between the incidents at the above mentioned office as they exonerated themselves as they always have and the dangerous precedence of the Court house as if the defendant committed crimes against the public. 

This chain of causality would have landed this Plaintiff in jail – in spite of the very ardors process which he may not recant and would have suffered a more demanding future damages (chain of causality) were it not for other unanticipated matters arising from Day 1 in Court. Thus, it is impossible to deny that the indicia of recognition also taint the Court by affinity of that process – either from a commission to criminal or to civil – and as indictments that may be defended but none of these happened. The so-called entity privately worsted the plaintiff in areas that are not visible, including a ban on his travel from the United States or from New York to any State – the later strictly on permission by the Court which it was obligated to honor.           

If these inglorious reasons are not meeting for actions on the part of the Judge, there is other process that might endure the punitive exactness of law going by the poor show at the Court and for such a court that is eager to prosecute….  

The punishment was itself not warrantless and like the arrest it is a problem, it is the punishment to harm the Plaintiff in the long run that is important. For it seems that serious abuse of discretion is stake here, it is also the issue of 'proximate cause' of the further breakdown of the plaintiff's family, since he would have been welcomed, and would have kept his job, and found one, but for the fact that he matched so deliberately and so wrongly, that the Plaintiff didn't have a face in public or before his employer and above eyed with suspicion by his family. Such negligence and general exercise of law and process, it was also a breach of contractual agreement between City of New York Taxi and Limousine Commission, a commission, and the City and State of New York which they should deal with. Even the most prudent of man or woman, will have problem understanding why a shelter system such TLC and its foundation, and by association TLC would make life worse for already struggling and suffering Welfare recipients, especially those who are authorized by actions of the State.

Further indexing on this matter is 1871 Civil rights official policy and customs, where the instance of one and isolated incident which became the basis of municipal liability under 42 U.S.C.A is probing check to an Act of the infamous KKK Act of 1871.

In meeting that the ineluctable arguments about the verity of the case and the persons of interest, such Steven Silverberg, representing at a Junior to cooperate Counsel of David Caruso, all for the City and State of New York, we may compare the gaps in presenting the suits to the merits, which the later more than satiate even in the land of burden of proof which the 5th Amendment and the invocations of Brady Rule, more than endorses that at no point – even under duress should any American be forced to conform to the levity of prosecution without witnesses, no – one resident in the United States should under any pressing conditions be forced against his or her wishes to endure the merest attention detention for given period of time, unless so conducted with permission of the Judge (Search warrant) and by a law enforcement officer in the limits of 90 minutes (1 HOUR 30 Minutes) of constitutionally allotted delay for seize and seizure, that such persons must and would be released when there are no criminal reasons to further hold him.

This criminal reasons are based on the precedence and prevailing past records of the said individual, saving if such persons constitute a Security Threat to the Community – assuming leaves of Habeas Corpus is applied and the suspect under custody – or in immediate and prevailing status of the suspect as a detainee, his or her security alert should be upheld only to the National Security. 

“On August 7, 2013, plaintiff filed a 13-page document entitled,"Response to Defendant's Challenge to Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint" ("Plaintiff's Response"). Portions of that submission appear to imply that plaintiff never received the Third M&O, stating "that the letter sent to the plaintiff on July 24th 2012 was the same letter from January 2012." Plaintiff's Response at 2. However, that document also quotes from the Third M&O, id. at 5, and expressly states that plaintiff "responded to this July 24th, 2012 letter on August 11, 2012 with the Second Amended Complaint as the Judge ordered." Id. at 2.”

“Plaintiff's Response does not explain why the third amended complaint is nearly identical to the second amended complaint. Rather, Plaintiff's Response discusses various portions of the Third M&O, and attempts to provide some explanation for plaintiff's failure to obey that order.”

DISCUSSION

“Although Corporation Counsel urges this Court to dismiss this action pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, this Court deems it more appropriate to analyze the motion pursuant to Rule 8 of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure. See Ferran v. Office of Dist. Attorney of County of Rensselaer, 351 F. App'x 508, 509 (2d Cir. 2009) (summary order). Rule 8 requires, in relevant part, that a complaint contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief," Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), and that each averment be "simple, concise, and direct." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1). "The statement should be plain because the principal function of pleadings under the Federal Rules is to give the adverse party fair notice of the claim asserted so as to enable him to answer and prepare for trial." Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988) (citing Geisler v. Petrocelli, 616 F.2d 636, 640 (2d Cir. 1980)). "The statement should be short because `[u]nnecessary prolixity in a pleading places an unjustified burden on the court and the party who must respond to it because they are forced to select the relevant material from a mass of verbiage.'" Id. (quoting 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1281, at 365 (1969)).”

It matters here and elsewhere, that he, the Plaintiff, SAMPSON IROABUCHI ONWUKA, is due adversary party against City of New York with due respect to their action on October 22nd 2007, that he is Plaintiff by the Chain of Judicial events, since in Oaths at the Day 1 at Queens Court and under the watchful and intimidating eyes of the Judge and the bench was declared a defendant/respondent on October 23rd 2007, and was interrogated under the pain of Perjury on matters October 22nd, 2007, at the City of New York Taxi and Limousine office, in a matter between him, SAMPSON I. ONWUKA versus the PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK. The Plaintiff was not saved by the legal Counsel in of itself; he was saved by the last minute instance of the evidence in forms of Video by attorneys, a failure which is yet to make its meaning in the round of bench arguments. Such roles that evidences play matters in this case because a Branti exception without Brady materials is not American law, especially in Pretrial. In the light most favorable to the defendant, it is impossible to deny that their allegations were faulty from the beginning, and was begun with no intention of landing the criminal and served no State or legal purpose saving that of malice.

The Plaintiff was twisted with duration for remedy alone, there were other items in the overall damages to the Plaintiff, of which is the persons of the Counsel attending to him or so mentioned a date, the persons of his latter attorney and the  Court would hear the argument by the defendants that role of attorney was meeting significance that the State of New York or the City of New York on the said and after, provided the victim with a Right to Counsel including the ones practicing at the State Court and Queens County Court.  The plaintiff needs to identify the incident of Counsel on a case by case process does not achieve the merits of a counsel saving the facts of the Day 1 in which the counsel was pre-eminent in the thorough going process. That in terms of the process involved in recognizing 1988 attorney role of prevailing party, the Plaintiff must mention that he, Sampson Iroabuchi Onwuka, pursued the legality of his Court mediation and settlement, largely on pro se, that his effort is getting the large number of the officers mentioned and officers themselves was not in vain and was not to monkey the situation.

The Plaintiff has proof that his attorney also appeared on that day and had paid him an applause of 350 dollars which covered his travels as he claimed, but out attempt at obtaining the Evidential Showing of the crucial materials involved at the Queens Court, for instance the Video Tape or CD, and attempt at certiorari of the 'Civil Complain Review Board', and of course other police officers, did not amount to anything useful. These attorneys parted ways with the Plaintiff and the Counsel was replaced by the City and State of New York. For that the Plaintiff, Sampson Iroabuchi Onwuka, knowing what amounts to a 1988, seeks to impeach any such effort by citing that the October 23rd 2007 day 1 in Court was a matter between him, the Plaintiff and the People of the State of New York, and it is a Statement of fact secured by the Queens Criminal Court Complain which should conservatively preserve the Plaintiff’s right of redemption. Seeking to obtain in the first two weeks after the final days in Court the assistance of District Attorney in why women attorney are usually hired out as receptionist.

Not even an appointment was possible and my complaint to her and her assistance was never met and the reports never found. It was a wasteful process that has not even recognized the welfare and financial damage and wage loss and possible continued future damages and future losses to the Plaintiff. But he is human and it’s not bereft of memory and not unaware of the problems he’s facing from the Court. Perhaps the fault was the Plaintiffs since you probably needed attorney to a D.A to end a case or forward argument for any form of wage losses or considerations. Self-representation is the worst representation but this is not a criminal charge of one private against another, this is a toeing a line of procedure that leaves the Plaintiff with some defense of his money and wages and it was beyond the court unless they also personal interest in the process.

The Plaintiff, Sampson Iroabuchi Onwuka, equally presses at this opening level, a case of Betts v. Brady (1942), where the counsel was necessary was meted to be the case within “special circumstances” of the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, subordinate to the Search and Seizures with respect to a property found and was based of the materiality of evidence or the assigned Counsel of the individual of interest. It may make sense here that  a diligent consideration of the immateriality of legal counsel after the facts of the arrest and his incarceration is to be considered, that direct evidence was the bases of the adjudication to the Circuit 6, that at no point was such thing Miranda rights read to him to have led to the Counsel, that both parties, especially the plaintiff, didn't really understand what was going on the whole process, prove of this was the fact that CITY of New York Taxi and Limousine Commission effected the arrest and not the City of New York Police and for long hours detained the Plaintiff before his arrest papers and warrant were sent. The Miranda could not have even taken place, let alone the incident of the counsel at the instigation of the Plaintiff. What does it matter?

“Where a pro se plaintiff's complaint fails to comply with Rule 8's pleading conventions, a district court should not dismiss the action "without granting leave to amend at least once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated." Branum v. Clark, 927 F.2d 698, 705 (2d Cir. 1991). Indeed, in light of the "jurisprudential preference for adjudication of cases on their merits rather than on the basis of formalities," the Second Circuit has held that "it will generally be an abuse of discretion to deny leave to amend when dismissing a nonfrivolous original complaint on the sole ground that it does not constitute the short and plain statement required by Rule 8." Salahuddin, 861 F.2d at 42. However, the Second Circuit made it clear that there were exceptions to this general rule, stating:

“We do not mean to imply that the court has no power to dismiss a prolix complaint without leave to amend in extraordinary circumstances, such as where leave to amend has previously been given and the successive pleadings remain prolix and unintelligible ....”

The plaintiff understands that his attempt at dividing the two cases, compel two part argument, one for 4th and 8th Amendment, and the other 5th and 14th, and he was considered as JJC (Johnny Just Come) and would not have mattered in persons and in ideas excluding a procedural entitlement and a complaint that is attenuated at a higher level of law but will not be able to apply the law to the process at any level, especially when they are inextricably linked through the 1st Amendment being the only reason why the dead and deadly 1915 “un-suable entity” clause exist. A competent attorney or any one with Superior knowledge of the law would reduce this to 10 pages or less, but to a point that the least they will achieve as by counsel, a fast tract dismissal. The Court must understand that this case was not from the beginning dependent on the Counsel, that it way a levitating séance of the Rule of Evidence or Evidentiary Rule, that for a law or case to progress it, it must it certiorari. This was not the case of this day in Court and has never been.  

“Id. (citing cases). Indeed, the Second Circuit has upheld the dismissal of actions in which a party has been given opportunities to replead, but has continued to submit defective pleadings. See De Jesus v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., Inc., 87 F.3d 65, 72 (2d Cir. 1996) (upholding dismissal of an action in which the plaintiffs were accorded four opportunities to plead their claims); Armstrong v. McAlpin, 699 F.2d 79, 93-94 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding that a district court "did not abuse its discretion in refusing to give plaintiffs a fourth attempt to plead"); Prezzi v. Schelter, 469 F.2d 691, 692 (2d Cir.1972) (per curiam) (holding that dismissal of the action was appropriate where the original complaint was "a labyrinthian prolixity of unrelated and vituperative charges that defied comprehension" and the amended complaint failed to cure the prolixity and incomprehensibility), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 935 (1973).”

That the State of New York is a name within the law and a liable entity – liable within its own State, defines the infamy that the City of New York and City of New York Taxi and Limousine Commission, was the predicate between City of New York and State of New York and above all, that Actors such Anthony Holmes under any circumstances was the Casual Link since he was the second arresting officer and at the same time, the main witness whose testimony gave the Court their necessary armament to pursue a wrong and eager persecutions. It matters seems that the City of New York and State of New York were of the Right to Speedy Trial and were well aware of the Fast Track Rule, that there was no reason to continue with a case of no legal significance saving for Prejudice achieved through a denial of Due Process to the extent that the allegation was not withdrawn until a few weeks leading to the end of the time allotted for redemption by victims injured by the State and City of New York. For here as the Plaintiff has already indicated that the causality was entity that could not answer to anyone by a dead clause of the 1915 law, a clause which now explains itself as a constructive denial of process, that allows criminals acting under the Color of the State to abscond after bamboozle, and when a defendant has been coerced and psychology misled into forfeiting his or her remedy, same group will petition the City and so sue the State that forfeiture of this kind that be better used elsewhere. Majority of the cases that may it without punctures to any level of the State Court would on inquiry discover to have originated from Laws Firms and individual chambers affiliated with the Mayor’s office.

The Plaintiff pursues all redemption from the State of New York, whose allegations and testimonial entete proved the elements of personal seizure of the plaintiff and with Institutional bias against the Plaintiff, commenced criminal proceedings of the most egregious kind with no plans of convicting him. Such aggressive prosecution including an attorney posing as D.A trying to coax into a form of confession by injecting words not part of what happened leading to the earliest citations of Video. The Court chose to ignore the ugly and contemptuous behavior of the prosecutors by forcing the hearing to continue, by indicating that the clerk should stop typing when the Plaintiff’s attorneys were making a case for dismissal and so continued until the private resources of the Plaintiff diminished including sale of his car and a repossession of some property and child support settling of another, circulating records, aggressive 2008 vaction in reins, dislocation in property, confiscation of goods in Africa and failure to make and clear goods.

These actions of silence by City and State of New York proclaimed in silence, a dicta of 'immunity' over officers who conducted Search seizure on the plaintiff and arrested him without probable cause and without warrant on the said day would have imagine any outcomes other than the Queens Court verdict, may or may not have cared for the process. This is the height of irresponsibility, to the degree that it is not unexpected, for how else could a State or a City such the name/s City of New York and State of New York expect a new and separate outcome. That the said baby entities such as the City of New York Taxi and Limousine Commission and the offices of the Queens Attorney General, are beyond the law, that they are absorbed of all responsibility since a 1915 City of New York Ordinance clarified that these entities, particularly the City of New York Taxi and Limousine Commission is not a ‘suable entity’.

The Clause is a Grandfather Clause which is broached by the 4th Amendment and not unmitigated by the 13th that “what the State may not directly, it may not do indirectly”, that the said organization are no different from similar organization such as Federal Trade Commission, which are roundly challenged at Court and directly sued. This organization contrary to what is believed at Court is known to exhibit far more power than contextually permitted by the State of New York and by the City of New York.  The notional argument that a party under the flag of any state is bound by the state statute is meaning enough for such party either privately operated or publicly held to be accounted for through the State Status and hence no stranger to the limits of the Court.  The organization is either a child of the City Ordinance or a product of the State Law. Such States “Let…alone in the management of its purely domestic affairs...” can only perform these grants of authority as bound by the “Federal Constitution” 

In former account on the incident leading to the false arrest, false allegation, and malicious prosecution of the plaintiff, Sampson Iroabuchi Onwuka, sought to demonstrate how he was constrained by time to make arguments about the necessity of court Meditation in a matter between him as Plaintiff and Defendant/s State of New York, City of New York, et al, and the manner in which the principal Defendants and their main Actors, Anthony Holmes, Thomas Kavanagh, Laverne Miller, and the Judge Brandt of the Queens County Court, absconded after the initial allegations made it impossible for him to proceed with his life after the said day in Court, that on the said prosecution of law and court mediation on time, to the degree that the actions of the State of New York and City of New York in holding back very crucial information that could have brought the case to speedy end, was tantamount to the humiliation through the process, leading to the serious financial losses.

These individuals were released from City of New York Taxi and Limousine shortly after the incident at T.L.C office at October 22nd, 2007, and were no longer responsible or liable for injuries performed under the Color of the State, and could not have acted any other way when the said organization is not suable and legally answerable to anyone.  It was easy for them to abscond after bamboozle and easy to avoid the Court even if reflected a contempt, given their fore-knowledge that they were not responsible for the actions which was performed under such Colors as City of New York, and that the said organization was beyond the expectations of U.S Constitution. The Chain of discretion leading to the formation of this 1915 ordinance is that the Organization was a set of employees carrying out a set of predetermined City and State Laws and it was therefore not their fault, rather all suits against such organization is to be directed towards the State or the City. Your honor, the meaning of these interpretations are no longer applicable, for if the Complaint is no occasion for argument it is sacred, it means that facts from City records that the said Organization is now a privately owned organization acting under the pretext of City of New York is equally sacred proof of this would be their untouchable statuesque,…where as these are outlaws that these organization exercise the wherewithal at appointing their own Judges, their attorneys, and persons of interest acting for private reasons through public platforms.

City Hall of the City of New York explicated that a certain Judge Faye who posed as a City Administrator on behalf of TLC, was a per diem Judge hired by the said organization, that such a Judge with enormous influence of the attitude of the prosecutors, was not a City Judge or administrator. The information on the limits of City of New York Taxi and Limousine Commission is set is such a way as to suggest that it was acquired through coercion especially in the Color of the State and the City of New York. 

The example of Benjamin Cardoso regarding the Buick dealership, where the Justice rendered a controlling opinion that the dealers were not responsible for the injuries resulting from faulty manufacturing of Buick, has been used to proclaim the weight of 1915 City Ordinance without proper consideration. The protection of the dealership does not transfer to a commission, since the former is not involved in product manufacturing, or acting with final products without human elements, the latter, is bound by City Ordinance, by State Statutes and Federal Constitution since the Final Product is not exactly ‘specified’ and it’s not expected to continue. 

Had this not being the formal case, a Commission would not be necessary, its actions are not transferrable to other States and the damage is not temporary. The said organization if so achieved by the City of New York operating Under the State of New York cannot pretend to deny their controlling influence on City of New York, that such Commission has only one purpose, which is to do for the State or the City what it could not achieve directly.

There is a reason why, and that reason being the agency is one the least unregulated Agencies since the age of Slave trade. But what does it matter that that Ku Klux Klan (KKK) after 6 career years was outlawed in these United States since such action does not begin to demonstrate the danger of giving any agency the unregulated powers to make laws, judge them and execute them. In U.S v. Hiram Reese and U.S v. William Cruikshank, et al, - 1815, the Supreme was forced to decide the ‘uncivil rites’ of the Mississippi “Redeemers”, the “Gun Clubs” and the “Bulldozers” which acted as State Sponsored organization – they were non-tax paying organizations – but were involved in molesting voters of a certain type in their States, a crime that they claimed had precedent in the Klan.

The Supreme Court was aware these clubs or organization were not suable but were answerable to some body, had to intervene largely for the record that mentioned organization were privately owned but involved so to speak for the good of the Community. But following the beating of certain Blacks under the Sheriff custody who wanted to vote by a number of these organizations including “KKK”, Federal Grand Jury indicted them. The difference between these organizations and a cryptic organization such as the TLC is the logo and umbrella, ‘City of New York’ without which their actions would have been no different including the legalized intent of extortion or coercion to form or forge opinion and ruin in the name/s of Taxi and Limousine Commission’ doing the good, the bad and the ugly for the City of New York.

I would think your honor that the above mentioned organization suffered identity indictment going to the limits of 1883, that “It is proper to state that civil rights, such as are guaranteed by the constitution against State aggression, cannot be impaired by the wrongful acts of individuals, unsupported by State Authority in the shape of laws, customs, or judicial or executive proceedings. The wrongful acts of an individual, unsupported by any such authority, are simply a private wrong, or a crime of that individual.” For this to be true, it is fitting that the premise of ‘unsuable entity’ is abstract conjecture that is not reduced to human and individual elements and such conjecture is the dead and certain as the ordinance impotent as the force beyond the quick, else it is a law of robotic fitting for sciences and final products and not for Americans with voting rights and freedom to exercise choice or judgment. If the said the lines are also acceptable, then the 1915 clause is equally acceptable to the limits of the paper construction of the clause and would not apply to items or such humans or in any case animals such as horses operating under such pretext. 

And above all, the specific character of these wrongful Acts performed or would have been performed by any such persons or actors as mentioned above, could not have taken place anywhere else or is relate-able to actions in real life by such persons saving the direct and indirect instance of active pursuit of liberty and happiness and others in the line of duty. It would also torch in so far as the taxes and voting rights are concerned a failure of the equal rights protection going the separation of rights from privilege, and can only manufacture the précis of an equal and unjust administrative of process or law by said City or State; infra Boyd v. US (1887) where they were invocations of 1761 – to century and half later.  The Specific Character of these actions include the search and seizure and detention leading without surprises to public prosecutions, whereas the limits of their actions had already been transgressed since they were acting with doctrine of the un-suable.    

The City of New York under Michael Bloomberg, the Mayor, and by association ‘Bill De Blasio’ vested such unmitigated powers on City of New York Taxi and Limousine Commission, knowing Pluribus unum, that from example of such careless act, the rest will follow. The Plaintiff assumes in-cognito that the City of New York essentially legislated on these policies, to principally damage the Civil Rights of certain constituted persons, to the degree that it is possible for the best of them to deny any wrong doing, the dynamic working losses

“In this case, as in De Jesus and Armstrong, plaintiff has had four opportunities to amend his pleading. This Court has previously rejected three defense request to dismiss this action. On all three occasions, this Court attempted to assist plaintiff by identifying claims suggested by the facts and providing guidance on how to draft a complaint stating those claims. This Court also advised plaintiff that he could receive assistance in drafting his complaint by contacting the Pro Se Office at this courthouse.”

Your honor as stated in previous correspondence that the plaintiff turned to any available hands in narrating the 1983 since the Court did not find the 10 page complain as meeting standard for his suit. The Court set unusual standard for a pro se by asking to basically perform magic through a 4th, and 14th Amendment which the Court did not indicate to him, through the use of 1983 with 1915 as a bullet proof, through the use of 1928 with the case traveling through the City and the State with the time limit against him and his compeers, to present the case and suit without fault which in spite of the behavior of the Defendant, is to be forced to meet all the standards of the Supreme including its seven part process and an argument against honorable Judge Sandra Towne who is striking from every distance. Plainly speaking, the Court believes that the high standards is impossible to meet let alone trespass that the material issue of torture through process was no longer an item.  

If the Plaintiff turned to the Crux of the 4th Amendment achieved from lectures and training through 14th Amendment, that any attorney would still have problems in prevailing in New York Supreme Court with 1983 in spite of the blows to the chest that the Plaintiff suffered on this day, that the Police was not also present, difficult to prevail since the court has a long standing petition that one incident was a prove that it was court process. You are asked to perform a surgical heart procedure from looking at the medical text, without only offhand comment by doctors busy elsewhere and above all, the patient is bleeding red in the emergency room. It is a feat of courage that the patient survived your

To proof a criminal case from civil perspective using 1983 is both an assault procedure and a trap, a trap no doubt since you are unlikely to proceed very far without the more serious cases of the defendant’s criminality which the Supreme Court has no interest or even power to pursue.

It’s possible including those who were willing to take on the case giving the high standard determined for it. It was simply cut and dry, that the City of New York and State of New York used means not prescribed elsewhere and Court to deny the Plaintiff early termination of a case that had no merit from beginning and it ended sinking a reasonable part of his finances.

“Plaintiff, however, has proven to be unwilling or unable to follow this Court's instructions. Indeed, plaintiff's two most recent pleadings can only be described as labyrinthian and prolix, crammed with vituperative charges and sprinkled with conclusory allegations. While plaintiff's early pleadings at least suggested causes of action—albeit not causes of action against the TLC, the only named defendant—plaintiff's two most recent pleadings are virtually incomprehensible.

“In its Third M&O, this Court explained the problems with the Second Amended Complaint and again provided guidance as to how to draft a complaint that met the requirements of Rule 8. The Third M&O specifically warned plaintiff that this Court would dismiss this action if he failed to follow "the specific directions set forth in this, and prior[ ] orders." Third M&O at 7; 2012 WL 3043202, at *5 (alterations added). Yet, plaintiff responded to the Third M&O by filing a third amended complaint which was virtually identical to the second amended complaint. Moreover, when defense counsel moved to dismiss the third amended complaint, plaintiff responded by implying that he had never received the Third M&O, despite the fact that the response itself cited to the Third M&O.”

“This Court is cognizant of the "jurisprudential preference for adjudication of cases on their merits rather than on the basis of formalities," and the judicial reluctance to dismiss an action on account of a plaintiff's failure to adhere to pleading formalities. However, in light of history of this case, it is abundantly clear that plaintiff is either unwilling or unable to follow this Court's orders and produce a complaint that meets the requirements of Rule 8. The pleadings produced thus far do not provide fair notice of the claims plaintiff intends to raise. If this Court were to require an answer to the most recent pleading, Corporation Counsel would have to attempt to select the relevant portions from an unwieldy "mass of verbiage." Salahuddin, 861 F.2d at 42. Given plaintiff's unexplained failure to comply with the Third M&O, granting plaintiff permission to amend his pleading once again would be entirely futile. Under these extraordinary and extreme circumstances, dismissal of this action is the only appropriate remedy.”

CONCLUSION

“For the reasons set forth above, Corporation Counsel's motion to dismiss this action is granted and this action is dismissed. The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) that any appeal from the order would not be taken in good faith and therefore in forma pauperis is denied for the purpose of any appeal.”

SO ORDERED.

A diction of the process.

1.       Aluta Continua...

2.       8/07/13

3.       Bad Acts of the Defendant

Your honor,

But of course, these individuals are sued in their official capacities and not particularly on an individual basis, as such, the legal materials necessary to convict any particular indigene of the case does not triumph over the municipality which the Respondent Superior is adjudged by New York State Law to be the Mayor of New York City and the elected Governor so elected. Since the individual is also the institution individual actions and capacity of or for actions is inexcusable from Municipal Practice.

Your honor, then and now, the Mayor of New York City is Michael Bloomberg, and as far the officials who act under the color of the state and in the vise of TLC is concerned, he is the top of the Pyramid and legally answerable. It is not just the New York State Law; it is Federal Law as defended by Supreme Court Judges.

Whereas, the Plaintiff also argued that while part of the Discovery of Rule of Rule 26 (A) is governed by Rule (11) of not signing a letter adjudged from the Prevailing Party, that the prevailing circumstances of time and knowledge of the letters by the Plaintiff to the defendants are letters that has record and therefore complaints that must be defended or at least responded to.

In as much as, the same track record of matters after the facts of the Court, that the Plaintiff made the arguments dismissal of the prosecution by the defendants automatically entitles the Plaintiff to the easy half of the Summary Judgment. This half is based on the failure of the Defendant and Respondent, City of New York, State of New York, Et al, to clearly state the case against the Plaintiff that they did not bother to answer for their prosecutions, absconded after Bamboozle and left the hearing and court case which they began to die a slow and natural death.

Whereas, the State of New York did confer immunity from suit, that Rule 12, it does not transfer from the act of doing anything wrong to the argument of presenting, where the plaintiff however had he tried will be made to accept that he failed to 'state a claim of violation of clearly established laws'

For the record and for the second time, the Judge did not ask for a Third Amended complaint, NOT in the last correspondence or presently of July 24th, 2012, or from something else, that this particular fact is important since the Plaintiff had access to published public opinion on this Court's and Honorable Judge Sandra L. Townes' recent decisions. The opinion cited a clause for a Third Amended Complaint by her Honor, but this comment is not available on the principal letter from the Judge dated July 24th, 2012.

Judge's order for a Third Amended Complaint can be followed based on the instructions which is available in previous correspondences, but cannot be followed on micro-analyses of the smallest details of the "clearly inapplicable". Plaintiff has more than met the outlines stated by the District and now demands that the Court take or at least respect the right course of action as the case would seem.

But let it known that many people who I, the Plaintiff, sent the copy of the Second Amended Complaint, considered it up-to-date saving for the rampart incident of error of incomplete sentences and incomprehensible paragraphs. But as the format itself, there was little they could advice on.

Here, I share the Judge Sandra L. Townes concern for the loose and incomplete sentences in the Second Amended Complaints and I believe the Judge is right that some of the argument seem disconnected and a lot of sentences in the Second Amended Complaint did not make a whole complete sense. But the laws of these U.S States is not a question of one's ability or lack of thereof of making complete sentences pro-piece, that it amount to micro-analysis beyond the 'Face Level' to paper out the loose of every sentence from 137 pages long Complaint.

The Laws of the U.S State does not bend to anyone's lapses in Grammar even when it might have seen to construe a different meaning, and it is only formal to remake the argument that 'Ignorance of the Law' is not an excuse and as such loose sentences are not a polar tent of law to be defrayed at all cost and by every means necessary. Above all, I will like to mention that as far as the Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint is concerned that there is a enough legal parameters that was raised by the Plaintiff pro-piece, that should shrink the shortfalls in the paper into insignificance, that the papers were for many reasons not "unserviceable" and the legal citation were to be defended.

It is understandable that both the Court Clerk and Respondent performed the same error of still placing "TLC" as an argument against the Plaintive, as if the Plaintiff has not followed every detail of the Judges' Order and Memorandum. Silverberg and in so far as the Clerk account is concerned, the information of the Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complain must be updated to include ‘City of New York’, et al, exclude “TLC” as a defendant since these two piece of information is well stated in the response from the Plaintiff.

Honorable, the letter also suggested “Accordingly, it is unclear whether plaintiff intends to sue these four individuals, if plaintiff does intend to give them, they should be included in the caption".

Based on this statement, it is not impossible to see what the attorneys who took the Plaintiff's case eventually dropped off. There is no denying that the case has migrated from ordinary pursuit of recovery to something else. "At a minimum, Plaintiff must state whether these defendants are male or female, indicate whether no officers worked for the T.L.C, or The New York City Police Department, and provide whatever other information plaintiff may have that would assist in identifying these defendants."

Your honor, this is a gross misrepresentation of the Plaintiff's informed Amended Complaint and Second Amended Complain. If the Judge Sandra Towne or consultative member of his Chambers cannot argue for the Plaintiff's right to 'Summary Judgment', they should at least move for a trial since the Plaintiff has more than requested for it from the beginning and past and present Oaths of Office does not imperil the judgments which the law through its corrective and sometime punitive career has more than sealed as inevitable.

The gaps in the statement are not the same as the gaps in the law and not on the same category as the gaps in some of the conclusions that are evident in the overall....If the Judge should disagree with the position of the law and the plaintiff, perhaps she should deal with the case through trial basis and allow the Plaintiff attract 'Attorneys' that are worthy of pressing legal standards in the U.S Supreme Court.

It is an American Right to be heard and it is the Judge's right to transfer the case from one form to another

"The Second Amended Complaint suggests a basis for Federal Jurisdiction, Stating that his Civil Rights Actions" is brought Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. & 1983. However, the pleading also cites to 28 U.S.C & 1334, which relates to bankruptcy proceedings and is clearly not applicable here."

Claim 68 by the Plaintiff's "Second Amended Complaint' will show that "Pursuant to 28 U.S.C & 1331, the Plaintiff believes that the mediation of the Federal Court at this level may be appropriate, giving by the fact that Supreme Court has Jurisdiction over the State, (and) that his Civil Right actions are brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C& 1987. The Court has subject matters Jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C 1331 (Federal Questions), 28 U.S.C & 1334 (3) and (4) Civil Rights). 28 U.S.C and 1367 (Supplementing Jurisdiction)"

That from the stated example we can see that that the Plaintiff was clearly leaning towards 28 U.S.C 1291, 1292, 1293, 1295, as he previously stated in his itemized citation, that these were Status that formed the basis of actions that the Federal Court with respect to final decisions of a District Court of any particular case will adjudicate. That these Status reveal that such cases which has passed through a District Court are not appealable under any circumstances, and are therefore within the duty of a higher court to adjudicate on the quality of final decisions.

But more important is the issue of 28 U.S.C &1334 which the Judge cited on, and we can maintain that that 28 U.S.C & 1334 is an indigene of Plaintiff's Claim 68, a 'decibel indigene' of Claim 68 of a lower degree that it is misleading to place Bankruptcy Law as cursory replacement for Claim 68. 28 U.S.C & 1334 was never meant. Surely, we can fail to recognize a hint of contradiction. Yet I doubt if the Judge of the letter January 6th, 2012, is the same of this particular July 24th, 2012. Judge Sandra Towne may have given it her sanctions but she is hardly the author of this up trust.

And she continues, that "Although the Second Amended Complaint attributes specific Acts to other defendants, some of these are not alleged to have violated Plaintiff's constitutional rights. For example, the pleading alludes to an "attempt by Kavanagh, Holmes, Bonilla, and (others) to beat and arrest the guy by Police" but does not state that the Plaintiff was "the guy" id, at 99.

"Moreover the Complaint should what contain only allegations. There is no need to substantiate those allegations at this Junction; to quote from or cite to legal authorities, such as statutes and cases, or to address potential defenses, such as qualified immunity or collateral estoppels.

December 28th, 2010, to maintain a $ 1983 action, a plaintiff must allege both that the conduct complained of was "committed by a person acting under the color of State law" and that this conduct deprived the plaintiff "of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States." Pitchell v. Callan, 13 F.3d 545, 357 (2d Cir. 1994) (emphasis added)."

"If Plaintiff wishes to state a due process claim against the TLC, he must describe the actions he took to appeal the TLC's decision to suspend or revoke his license."

Proper doctrines of res judiacata Judgment (Rule 52) and estoppel by Judgment is evident in the January 6th, 2012 letter of the Judge where she cited that 1915 (e)(2)(B) (ii) and Fed. R. Civ. P.41 (b), which has to do with Rule 26 of US court procedure, which limited the voluntary showing of evidence to 14 days. That Courts are mandated to throw away any case - especially pretrial cases - after 30 days if the Plaintiff could not bring in the evidence in the course of the actions or actors so stated, that impunity of immunity only plays forward from here when there other non-liabilities matters arising from the probabilistic.

Exception or near exception to this rule is in terms of 'immunity' of Plaintiffs, such 'immunity' equally calls for 'early dismissal' of any such instance of necessary immunity and that it involves; Rule 26 (a) (3) (A) (iii), Federal Rule of Evidence 402 & 403. Since the defendants were not granted immunity by the State of New York, or protected by any federal privilege, they were notionally bound by Fed Civ. 55. Prove of this immunity would be the Defendant's motion for 'Summary Judgment' during the course of the Court deliberation or during Pretrial which in New York is trial.

The Plaintiff is by the circumstances of reason and the inability of both parties to reach a compromise awarded the Amended Complaint was directed towards the body of the issues concerned, that the Plaintiff discussed themes from the incident by reverting to the claims as he stated in his earlier Amendment. That he was not saved by the body facts alone, there was no the issue of Court proceedings at the District Court level and above all, there are now matters of law.

Amendment Rules; 1946, that the near lack of Rule 51 is not a preserved by Rule 52, especially the 'exceptional circumstances of time'. Pursuant to Rule 55, the Plaintiff moves to exclusionary default to Judgment which only the Judge can grant.

(A)   III

The Inherit bias associated with.... "A claim is facially plausible when "The Plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the Court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendants is liable for the misconduct alleged"

That it has more than the sheer possibility "more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully:"

A complain that "Pleads fact that are merely consistent with a defendant's liability....stops short of the time between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief" 1.d (quoting Bellv     

If the Courts Orders and Memorandum were taken seriously, it does follow that actions taken so far by the Court and the Plaintiff merits a hearing on the itemized courses so mentioned in the Plaintiff's three Complaints in the last three years. Above all the correspondences are now within the three (3) years mark for actions incumbent on the Court and on the Supreme Court Judge given the exact ratio of the high prejudice of the case to low probative value.

It is not surprising that the Judge kept indicating that the Defendants did nothing wrong in spite of the 136 (137) pages of US legal pyramid built from scratch by the Plaintiff to the threshold of mandamus if not performed but converted. No surprise since the surgical procedure necessary to disentangle the web is meeting for an attorney and to absorb issues of bias, the Court is interested in Federal Licensed Attorneys. Honorable Judge Sandra Towne citing that the Defendant City of New York did nothing wrong is understandable and makes for a fresh remake of complaints, yet Judge Bloom and the Court should be worthy of the fact that the complaints was done in light of several other cases which involved direct Court and Judge intervention and is resolved with due respect to time and failure of the Court to act or their role in enabling the 'Fast Tract' rule.

Supreme Court for almost all the reasons of the Eleventh Amendment where supposed to thread carefully on Court proceedings leading from Citizens to a State, that a Citizen of these United States is not required to sue a fellow Citizen as so described in forma accounts. But since the advent of the John Marshall as Chief Judge and the role of the Supreme Court from the Civil Wars in the United States in breaking up excessive controlling multi-national corporation who engineered the appointment of judges for and by their own interest including the incident of the Samuel Chase, the Supreme Act has entertained all cases that are constitutional injurious to a Citizens of these United States, in especially in cases between such privates and big corporations who from the Aegis of Taney and to some extent Chase, exist as entities that were not legally liable to much atrocities or hints of corruptions and injury meted to their workers.

Even at the end of the Civil Wars following the ‘over-the-top’ dicta of Taney, these individuals and their corporative interest denied doing anything wrong to their hired workers, denied that there was anything morally wrong with firing workers who lost their elbows or thumbs during work on the field.    

As someone mentioned that during this period, indentured white workers, blacks and others, worked in the farm houses, tenants in their own farms, sharecroppers, cobblers and all the workers called George, were routine fired with no compensations and there was nothing wrong with removing aging workers without pay and hiring people on contract so long as they pay their own taxes from a share of crops. Your honor, it took the Supreme Court and the National Labor Relations Relation Board to put an end to all that. As long as victims of this sort of tragedy are carefully silenced with the 1915 ‘not suable’ status of City of New York Taxi and Limousine or the failure of the Court to take the Oaths of Court seriously, that until there are enough judges that have spent enough time in jail over such laughable process, there is nothing wrong with misleading the Court over alleged actions by the Defenders, nothing wrong in posing a set of indictment with the People of the State of New York, and seeking to incarcerate the Plaintiff by the statement that  he was observed punching a police. To all instance of the same challenges which some people may have faced, the Court removed the console that help to save on that day and place someone else.

Alexander Hamilton “there is not a syllable in the plan under consideration which directly (italics in original) empowers the national courts to construe the laws according to the spirit of the constitution.” (Number 82, Federal Papers), Peter Charles Hoffer, et al, (2007) reacting to this statement mentioned that ‘In other words, if the authority was not spelled out in the constitution, it could not be exerted.’ Article IV “This constitution and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof and all treaties…in every state shall be bound thereby,”, whereas Article III, defining the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court extended this to all cases, that “to all cases…arising under this constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties …both as to law and fact.” What in the US Law called legal facts are citations based on previous Court remedies whereas laws in the United States are strictly a matter of Constitution in the least item of it.

The embarrassing deist from these precautions is separate politics or opinion or anyone from Constitution and its interpretation which the Supreme Court in all circuit is expected to pronounce. If Judge Sandra Townes pronounced a judgment based on law, the lacuna of a Second Amendment Complaint will exit the platform of 28 U.S.C; 1915 forma Pauperi. But there was no legal citations opposing this pyramid by the plaintiff, as such the Judge’s leniency may consigned to opinion which by her previous letters is considered an assumption and by her letters in order US laws, assumptions are not permissible. But the territorial leniency of the Judge does compromise the edit in her Court Order and Memorandum to remake the papers, it is appreciable fair that the instance of Rule 12 as her primacy is to the merest estimate of the Law and the Court process ridden to the Caption of the plaintiff’s First Amendment – a correction that dates from November 2010 and the corrections are imperiled by the Court actions and by the Clerk and not the Plaintiff.

Regarding the forma pauperi, this status should not overlooked but taken seriously, that the point is made through the Chief Justice (General) John Marshall who was witnessing to the British burning the US Capital forcing the Supreme Court to go underground and literally a house donated to its operation.

Yet the Judge positions is not imperiled by judicial arcana of the Second Order for an Amended Complaint, but it is perilous to contentious issue of ‘administrative of justice’ and the yeomanry that limits the a private from engaging a private in the threshold of the Supreme Court. In remainder of the papers of that has been sent to this Court, this Private so billed as a Plaintiff, Sampson Iroabuchi Onwuka, is setting his argument against the Capacities of the State Actors involved, such as the law by its dictates is from previous and current Oaths, the persons of the Mayor, ex-officio Michael Bloomberg, and current Bill Blasio, et al. The Court must also remedy this issue in indicating that nothing in these pages or in previous correspondence between him and the court and regarding the inactivity of the Queens Court, is imperiled by any Status and Ordinance in the United States, that the ‘grant of authority’ is obtaining redemption is to the extent of 5th Amendment, where the Supreme Court following the Chisholm v. Georgia (1793) declined to protect a State from a Suit.

Justice Iredell declined to deal with this case involving debt collection and in fact dismissed citing lack of jurisdiction over the State Court. Chisholm filed a case with the Supreme Court citing original jurisdiction for cases then and now “in which a State shall be party” with meaning on the grant of original jurisdiction in Article III.  This state which was resolved later yielded the Judiciary Act of 1789, section 13, granting the Supreme Court power to issue Judicial Command or Habeas ; “of Mandamus, in cases warranted by the principle and usages of law, to any Courts appointed or persons holding office under the authority of the United States.” This matter of law so ahead of facts only from circumstance, so ahead of deductions or even reasons which are comprisable is undeniable in meaning of the Actions of the Queens Court and in the refusal of the Law to proceed to enders note or to summary judgment binding to bother parties.

This plain exception of the Law and the Constitution of these United States are not subject to further review or within the shadow of the appellate Court unless such a Court would adjudge that Queens Court and Honorable Brandt not to have done anything wrong in of their self.  Yet an Oneiric would yet permission as by the said Constitution the plaintiff’s entitlement to grand jury as pleading from the Seventh Amendment with the backing of not only the Constitution but nearly all the Supreme Court judges whose council we may yet seek, whose judgment survives their end.      

Plaintiff has also mentioned that there are other facilities in the case which the court may not choose to ignore, which based on hundreds of cases involving the 1983 42 U.S.C is to be defended by opponents to prevailing parties with particular respect to the denial of 'Fast Tract Rule' and with due respect to the time. These laws are generally automatic that it is understandable for

May been submitted based entirely on the examples of Court denials of 'Fast Tract' rules and by legal pyramid of over 300 citations built by the Plaintiffs towards the exacting the purity of American laws violated in the process.

For else could he has survived, he would not have survived any day in the Court or been able to survive the whole process saving for the matter of luck and the material error of the Defendants on the Day I of the hearing. If in retrospect that the Judge Sandra Towne is leading the case towards the 'one time incident' within the shadow of 'municipal laws and practice', there are many points of deference to the case which the Plaintiff raised in Second Amended Complaint.

With part response to the locus standee, it is the argument that the Judge’s judgment ceases to impress on the case which involves the lack of 'summary Judgment' on the part of the Defendant and votive recourse of "Summary judgment" which the end of law in favor of the Plaintiff amounted to.

The conduct was done in Bad Faith and a suspect that of preposition of the Probable Cause did not call for a different result, 4, For it seems that the Plaintiff will more than likely pursue his rights and recovery from this Defendant on prose, because of the fact that the litigation does not involve Insurance and Benefit, that it involves an open discuss on the Summary Judgment, many attorneys suggest that taking the case on a contingency is out of the question.

Compliance with the U.S legal precedent can be enforced at the Queens County Court is bound by this procedure and that procedure involves a Day I in court, Day II of pre-trial, leading to final signal for summary judgment on the case. But the case from the beginning was beyond both parties on the technicality that it had very low probative value and high prejudice.

The Defendants (State of New York and City of New York), during the long prosecution against this Plaintiff, did not bother with Summary Judgment because they had no case ab initio, they couldn't have asked for summary judgment 'ipso facto' and couldn't even make the court because of the tape, and essentially absconded as the only thing they could have done.

The dismissal of the malicious process in favor of the Plaintiff was no 'patronage dismissals', as such the Plaintiff once argued, that the dismissal took place because the case was too much for the defendants, that the hearing and sworn disposition should not have made it to court saving for undisputed intent of the perpetrators; the City of New York and State of New York who led our courts into the path of oblivion, had emphasized an error and mistakes are there as such no real material resolution has taken place.

In respect to the Judge's decision, The Fourth Circuit held that it had "appellate jurisdiction to review an order denying a Rule 12 (b) (6) motion to dismiss based on absolute immunity." The issue resolves around the Court actions and discretion which in this particular note and respect to the evolution of the case, falls under incident of qualified immunity.

Whatever may be the reason why the Court’s Clerk decided to omit City of New York from the brief annotations from the Plaintiff’s response and in the official post card, and whatever may be the reason why the Court’s clerk is misplacing the priorities of the Plaintiff as stated in the Second Amended Complaint, and whatever may be their persuasion for failing to adapt the Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint to the smallest details of information on the clerk’s docket sheet, the Judge may better assert a corresponding mediation.

The Plaintiff argued that based on the notional problems associated with...the Judge must Therefore the Judge must enter judgment in clearing favor of the Plaintiff that such money in the name 'lost wages' should and must be to him by the City and State of New York, Should and must be entered as a judgment so secured by this Court.

The Court has not faired any better....The Bullet point from the Clerk will show that the assumptions in July 24th 2012 letter of the Judge and Honorable Sandra Towne's January 6th, 2012 instructions were items handled from earlier on. It does appear that the letters are riddled with repeat of process and citations from first letters without addressing the issues raised by the Plaintiff in his Amended Complaint and two Amended Second Complaints. For instance, the Judge re-introduced the issue of "TLC" in both the January 6th letter and the July 24th, 2012 letter, whereas the Plaintiff has hinted at the facts that from his 2011 through to 2012 Amended Complaints, the "TLC'' caption was not evident and was not in use.

But this is no longer the case, since 2011, the Papers that the Plaintiff submitted does not bear stamps of the caption "TLC" as defendant, does not deal with the criminality of the Defendants as it did in the first 10-Page unsigned letter from the Plaintiff, all of which is keeping with the Orders of the Judge and her advice in the December 28th, 2011 letters.

That the based on what is now available between the Plaintiff and the Court processes involved, the Plaintiff would not have expected the Court or any Court to act differently or that the Court should place emphasis on what exactly the Plaintiff was Charged leading to such disastrous overthrows. With unless if procedure is followed and, and if yes, if the questions of the degree of the damages was raised?

The Plaintiff does not wish to question of whether the Judge Townes citing of Rule 12 as opposing the Plaintiff's justified initiative is of any Did the Queens Court accord the Plaintiff the smallest benefit of the law by dismissing a case with such probative value and high prejudice, and if no, did it damage the Plaintiff and to what extent?

Did the Plaintiff suffer other constitutional violations involving the 4th, 6th, and 14th Amendment, and did he seek a State level tributary and remediation during the court ligature and after towards the recovery of the mentioned damages? If these points are well discussed and has occupied the mind of the Court from the beginning, it may have help to break the ice of the whole process and save the Judge from casting aspersion of a justly initiated legal suit.

The Plaintiff place the reason for this conclusion on the part of Judge Townes because the primary issues of the complaint was not even look at and the consequent effort to promote a case from Pro se` in spite of the difficult nature of the case is probably out of the question. Such outcome is unlikely to matter, for how could

For how could the Plaintiff by mentioned that one of the Defendant's falsely accused him of destroying TLC property and 'Punching a police officer', this last line began the Plaintiff's infamous descent into the legal mire and unusual Court troubles. Such allegations did not merit a day in Court except in terms of physical evidence or testimonies made by a defendant with some 'indicia of recognition' before the law, but for crimes which was known from the beginning to be incorrect, the Plaintiff should not have returned to that Court or had his property and license then as now confiscated.

Judge Lois Bloom must remember that the hearing was already concluded in the favor of the Plaintiff in our one of our Courts and that the Defendant had already began the process of that actions were already taken by both sides and that

The plaintiff was estranged from both sides and the individuals responsible for it, did not so much as rear up their face at the Court for a single day and expected the Queens County Court to indefinitely hold the plaintiff against his rights and wish, including a ban of his travel.

The end of common sense is that logic through materiality of evidence should prevail in any Court or for any Court where compliance, but when neither of these important aspects of Court process was respected, it is clear that the joints are not in place.

The plaintiff would not have expected the Queens Court to form the right estimate of the difficulties he experienced in 2007 and 2008, for sure, if the Plaintiff had other means of surviving he may overlooked the inefficacy of the Queens Court, but for the fact that these accusing and malicious lips absconded during the indigent efforts of the court to dismiss a faulty case, he was choked in the area of primary source of living, damaged beyond the social imaginative. The Injury is futuristic since there were no controlling record of the plaintiff, would have meant nothing had it been for the underlining structure of the municipality which gave leeway 

Plaintiff reputation for the odd and obvious challenges is tainted in bliss by other matters circulating elsewhere.....was materially and psychologically imperiled by the whole process.

The Plaintiff does not expect this Court or any court to fully grasp the weight of the injuries in the long and vacating years of 2007, 2008, 2009, and that in spite of partial awakening in 2010, the Plaintiff couldn't recover from the hastily executed public prosecution which armed the leading the party the notions of indictment whereas they had no intentions of pressing a case with such prejudicial entailment and low probity.

That from the earliest instances of the allegation material of the DAY 1 to the final and inconsequential final date as requested by the Plaintiff, the confrontation over the verbal discharges and secondary allegations of property damages where all actions considered in the keenest light of City Laws, would been dismissed without re-opening the case, that the City of New York and the State of New York so conspired to withhold the process of law was judicial usurpation of power, constituted acute formal deformation of Court process and amount to truancy in so far as the State torching the City and the City laws torching the Federal Constitutions were concerned.

The formal pyramid and entete for Court hearings on so small a case was trans-versed to the more disputable degree that actions from these laws as stated in the First and Second Amended complaints of the Plaintiff as from facts of the case, would not have followed any other form saving that of deliberate and conspiratorial denial of justice and constituted violations which the higher Court torching the lower must amend, or plead from Seventh torching the Fifth Amendment for a Jury which the Court must procure.  

It is within the threshold of these allegation material that fast track rule if so denied merits a second coming from the members of the Stated City and State/s; City of New York and State of New York, that furtherance to duly and expected execution of public as well Court obligations, this Court must by all the demands of the law and from all the baying rules that deems the office a viable American entity, respect the lowest demands of such a banter through Summary Judgment via Rule 51 is compromised by  Rule 12, or transfer the case to the Public by casting a no-contender case - within the limits of the Defender/s rights - however disaffecting to the current mayor since the said Parties were not adjudged to be a Prevailing Party ab initio, should therefore accept the final judgment as matter of Law.

But this like many instances of the City and the State of New York versus private, leaves a constituted City ordinance was gifted the wherewithal of an institution without the slightest opulence to legal responsibility.

The ‘Apple does not fall too far from the tree’ and every tree should bear its own fruit, unto all good works. The misinformation and misdirection regarding the 2013/2014 correspondences between the Plaintiff, Sampson Iroabuchi Onwuka, and the Court and between the Plaintiff and the Defendant, City of New York and State of New York, was due to the total failure of the Court to communicate. The error if they chose to disagree is not limited to this singular incident, it part of a pattern of clerk misinformation and false invocation of the Taxi Limousine Commission as defendant which in their own numbers and estimates was justifiable reason why Judge Townes had to dismiss the case.

The error should have been corrected from second Amended Complain going by the Judge’s order, even Judging  from the first amended complaint, the clerk failed one to many to literally relay the process of information which the Plaintiff procured through the most justifiable process of Court initiation only, does not mean there was hearing affixed already helping the Plaintiff persuade supreme court attorneys, that so spoken for the claims of asking for Court assistance at the Court was not respected or taken seriously. He is not dictating to the Court his rights for partial or equal consideration, or no consideration, the Plaintiff is not an item, the Plaintiff has serious case of Wage losses and financial ruins that the City and State of New York is directly responsible and it’s willing to divide the consequence of this neglect between the criminality and redemption. According to the Bible and what the Court calls Mosaic Laws, if a man kills another Cow accidentally and the process resulting the death of Cow is exercised as the fault of said man, the man who caused the death of the Cow or livestock should pay the victim the market worth of the Cow or exchange it on direct and equal basis. The law is old and a little shy of an ‘eye for eye’ and may be inferred here, that a man’s wages should and must be paid, that the ruins which the false allegations brought on him, must and will repaid. If none of these items are exercised so far, that the perpetrators of the acts being the City of New York and State of New York, they are bound by law which says so, to meet and pay the plaintiff his justly earned wage loss and compensate him for the lost wages and financial debacle due to the actions of the State and City Actors.

It meets here your honor, even to the most possessing shadow of doubt that this Plaintiff more than met the demands of a justly initiated legal process, for what lies within the process is mainly achievable in the process, that failure to honor the legal minutia associated with so lean a process was constitutional erring. The Queens Court of Fast Tract Rule erred in keeping the Case too long with extensive travel rights and limits of personal commitment to his business and those of his family. The Queens Court erred in failing to investigate the allegations of impropriety between a private and a municipality acting in this case under the 'Color of the State', for such investigation event to a highest possible standards will not have failed to furnish the outcome that the State by the Second Amendment of U.S Constitution and by the definition of the Second Circuit and this and their Court, in showing that the individual was falsely prosecuted.

What does it mean? It means what the laws says and so the Judge is bound to proclaim, that the (1) Court erred by interpolating between the Plaintiff; Sampson Iroabuchi Onwuka and the City of New York, State of New York, the Mayor, et al, by refusing to honor the problems of the Plaintiff leading to the Final Arguments which did not materialize to have made the said Defenders the Prevailing Party and so adjudged. The Queens Court erred (2) since it allowed a case with no formal basis to make to the Court, with no defendant from Day I, with allegations that has no legal meaning to continue for more than a Day in Court, with so low probity value and high prejudice and proved detrimental to the goodwill of the Plaintiff. The Queens Court erred (3) since for allowing the case to continue without due approbation to either side of the parties and for failing to force the Defenders from action extremely prejudicial to the Plaintiff and for the Public damages and Prosecution that the City of New York Taxi and Limousine Commission continued to mount against the Plaintiff. The Court erred (4) by permitting Bad Acts from the Prosecutors as if they decided the laws, that the Qualified immunity is preserved in Defendant believe Bad Acts, only and if only the defendants had motioned or asserted immunity defense, and if the defendant motioned for immunity on any grounds, then their motion is only as good as the title and indication of the title will show. The Court erred (5) since a case with so high prejudice and low probity should not have survived the length of this case